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Abstract
We review a recent body of theoretical work that aims to put numbers on the consequences
of globalization. A unifying theme of our survey is methodological. We rely on gravity models
and demonstrate how they can be used for counterfactual analysis. We highlight how various
economic considerations—market structure, ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, multiple sectors, inter-
mediate goods, and multiple factors of production—affect the magnitude of the gains from
trade liberalization. We conclude by discussing a number of outstanding issues in the litera-
ture as well as alternative approaches for quantifying the consequences of globalization.
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and Rogoff. We thank Rodrigo Rodrigues Adao, Jakub Kominiarczuk, Mu-Jeung Yang, and Yury Yatsynovich for
excellent research assistance. We thank Costas Arkolakis, Edward Balistreri, Dave Donaldson, Jonathan Eaton, Keith
Head, Elhanan Helpman, Rusell Hillberry, Pete Klenow, Thierry Mayer, Thomas Rutherford, Robert Stern, Dan Treﬂer,
and Jonathan Vogel for helpful discussions and comments. All errors are our own.1 Introduction
The theoretical proposition that there are gains from international trade, see Samuelson (1939), is
one of the most fundamental result in all of economics. Under perfect competition, opening up
to trade acts as an expansion of the production possibility frontier and leads to Pareto superior
outcomes. The objective of this chapter is to survey a recent body of theoretical work that aims
to put numbers on this and other related comparative static exercises, which we will refer to as
globalization.
A unifying theme of our chapter is methodological. Throughout we rely on multi-country
gravitymodelsanddemonstratehowtheycanbeusedforcounterfactualanalysis. Whileso-called
gravity equations have been estimated since the early sixties, see Tinbergen (1962), the widespread
use of structural gravity models in the ﬁeld of international trade is a fairly recent phenomenon, as
also discussed by Head and Mayer (2013) in this volume. The previous handbook of international
economics is a case in point. In his opening chapter, Krugman (1995) notes: “the lack of a good
analysis of multilateral trade in the presence of trade costs is a major gap in trade theory.” This
view is echoed by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) who argue that: “The gravity models are strictly
descriptive. They lack a theoretical underpinning so that once the facts are out, it is not clear what
to make of them.” But the times they are a-changin’.
The last ten years have seen an explosion of alternative microtheoretical foundations underly-
ing gravity equations; see Eaton and Kortum (2002), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Bernard,
Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Chaney (2008), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). While
new gravity models encompass a large number of market structures—from perfect competition
to monopolistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003)—and a wide range
of micro-level predictions, they share the same macro-level predictions regarding the structure of
bilateral trade ﬂows as a function of bilateral costs. It is this basic macro structure and its quanti-
tative implications for the consequences of globalization that we will be interested in this chapter.
Recent quantitative trade models based on the gravity equation share the same primary fo-
cus as older Computational General Equilibrium (CGE) models; see Baldwin and Venables (1995)
for an overview in the previous handbook. The main goal is to use theory in order to derive
numbers—e.g., explore whether particular economic forces appear to be large or small in the
data—ratherthanpurequalitativeinsights—e.g., studywhethertherelationshipbetweentwoeco-
nomic variables is monotone or not in theory. There are, however, important differences between
old and new quantitative work in international trade that we will try to highlight throughout this
chapter. First, new quantitative trade models have more appealing micro-theoretical foundations.
One does not need to impose the somewhat ad-hoc assumption that each country is exogenously
endowed with a distinct good—the so-called “Armington” assumption—to do quantitative work
in international trade. Second, recent quantitative papers offer a tighter connection between the-
oryanddata. Insteadofrelyingonoff-the-shelfelasticities, today’sresearcherstrytousetheirown
model to estimate the key structural parameters necessary for counterfactual analysis. Estimation
and computation go hand in hand. Third, new quantitative trade models put more emphasis on
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rich enough to speak to ﬁrst-order features of the data, like the role of country size and geography,
yet parsimonious enough so that one can credibly identify its key parameters and understand
how their magnitude affects counterfactual analysis.
Section 2 starts by studying the simplest gravity model possible, the Armington model. Build-
ing on Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), we highlight two basic results. First we
show that the changes in welfare associated with globalization, modelled as a change in iceberg
trade costs, can be inferred using two variables: (i) changes in the share of expenditure on domes-
tic goods; and (ii) the elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to variable trade costs, which we
refer to as the trade elasticity. Second we show how changes in bilateral trade ﬂows, in general,
and the share of domestic expenditure, in particular, can be computed using only information
about the trade elasticity and easily accessible macroeconomic data. We refer to this approach
popularized by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008) as “exact hat algebra.”
Armed with these tools, we illustrate how gravity models can be used to quantify the gains
from international trade deﬁned as the (absolute value of) the percentage change in real income
that would be associated with moving one country from the current, observed trade equilibrium
to a counterfactual equilibrium with no trade, i.e. an equilibrium with inﬁnite iceberg trade costs.
Since the share of domestic expenditure on domestic goods under autarky is equal to one, the
welfare consequences associated with this counterfactual exercise are easy to compute. Although
this is obviously an extreme counterfactual scenario that is (hopefully) not seriously considered by
policymakers, we view it as a useful benchmark that can shed light on the quantitative importance
of the various channels through which globalization affects the welfare of nations.
Section 3 extends the simple Armington model along several directions. First, we relax the
assumption that each country is exogenously endowed with a distinct good and provide alter-
native assumptions on technology and market structure under which the counterfactual predic-
tions derived in Section 2 remain unchanged. Second, we introduce multiple sectors, interme-
diate goods, and multiple factors of production and discuss how these considerations affect the
consequences of globalization. Third, we brieﬂy discuss other extensions including alternative
demand systems—that generate variable markups under monopolistic competition—and multi-
national production. Although one can still use macro-level data and a small number of elasticities
to compute the gains from trade in these richer environments, the results of Section 3 illustrate that
some realistic departures from the one-sector benchmark, such as the existence of multiple sectors
and tradable intermediate goods tend to increase signiﬁcantly the magnitude of the gains from
trade.
Section 4 focuses on evaluating trade policy. Instead of considering the welfare consequences
of a move to autarky, we study counterfactual scenarios in which countries raise their import
tariffs, eitherunilaterallyorsimultaneouslyaroundtheworld, usingthesimpleArmingtonmodel.
We then study again how these counterfactual predictions vary across different gravity models.
We conclude by discussing how to measure the restrictiveness of trade policy when tariffs are
2heterogeneous across sectors.
Section 5 reviews a number of outstanding issues in the literature. Since the main output of
quantitative trade models are numbers, a fair question is: Are these numbers that we can believe
in? To shed light on this question, we ﬁrst discuss the sensitivity of the predictions of gravity
models to auxiliary assumptions on the nature of trade imbalances and the tradability of capital
goods. We then turn to the goodness of ﬁt of gravity models in the cross-section and time series.
We conclude by discussing how elasticities, i.e., the main inputs of quantitative trade models, are
calibrated.
Sections 6 and 7 discuss other approaches to quantifying the consequences of globalization in
the literature. Section 6 focuses on recent empirical studies that have used micro-level data, either
at the product or ﬁrm-level, to estimate gains from new varieties and productivity gains from
trade. We discuss how such empirical evidence, i.e., “micro” numbers, relate to the predictions
of gravity models reviewed in this chapter, i.e., “macro” numbers. Section 7 turns to structural
approaches to quantifying the consequences of globalization that are not based on gravity models.
Due to space constraints, we do not review reduced-form evidence on the gains from openness;
see e.g. Frankel and Romer (1999), Feyrer (2009a), and Feyrer (2009b). Readers interested in this
important topic are referred to the recent survey by Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010).
Section 8 offers some concluding remarks on the current state of the literature and open ques-
tions for future research. Additional information about theoretical results and data can be found
in the online Appendix.
2 Getting Started
We start this chapter by describing how to perform counterfactual analysis in the simplest quan-
titative trade model possible: the Armington model. A central aspect of this model is the gravity
equation; see e.g. Anderson (1979) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). As we will see in the
next section, there exists a variety of microtheoretical foundations that can give rise to a gravity
equation, and in turn, a variety of economic environments in which the simple tools introduced
in this section can be applied.
2.1 Armington Model
Consider a world economy comprising i = 1,...,n countries, each endowed with Qi units of a
distinct good i = 1,...,n.
Preferences. Each country is populated by a representative agent whose preferences are repre-
sented by a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility function:
Cj =
￿
å
n
i=1 y
(1￿s)/s
ij C
(s￿1)/s
ij
￿s/(s￿1)
, (1)
where Cij is the demand for good i in country j; yij > 0 is an exogenous preference parameter;
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consumer price index is given by
Pj =
￿
å
n
i=1 y1￿s
ij P1￿s
ij
￿1/(1￿s)
, (2)
where Pij is the price of good i in country j.
Trade Costs. International trade between countries is subject to iceberg trade costs. In order to
sell one unit of a good in country j, ﬁrms from country i must ship tij ￿ 1 units, with tii = 1. For
there to be no arbitrage opportunities, the price of good i in country j must be equal to Pij = tijPii.
The domestic price Pii of good i, in turn, can be expressed as a function of country i’s total income,
Yi, and its endowment: Pii = Yi/Qi. Combining the two previous expressions we get
Pij = Yitij/Qi. (3)
Trade Flows. Let Xij denote the total value of country j’s imports from country i. Given CES
utility, bilateral trade ﬂows satisfy
Xij =
 
yijPij
Pj
!1￿s
Ej, (4)
where Ej ￿ å
n
i=1 Xij is country j’s total expenditure. Combining Equations (2)-(4), we obtain
Xij =
￿
Yitij
￿1￿s cij
å
n
l=1
￿
Yltlj
￿1￿s clj
Ej,
where cij ￿ (Qi/yij)s￿1. In order to prepare the general analysis of Section 3, we let # ￿
¶ln
￿
Xij/Xjj
￿
/¶lntij denote the the elasticity of imports relative to domestic demand, Xij/Xjj,
with respect to bilateral trade costs, tij, holding income levels ﬁxed. In the rest of this chapter we
will refer to # as the trade elasticity. In the Armington model it is simply equal to s ￿ 1. Using the
previous notation, we can rearrange the expression above as
Xij =
￿
Yitij
￿￿# cij
å
n
l=1
￿
Yltlj
￿￿# clj
Ej. (5)
Equation (5) is what we will refer to as the gravity equation.
Competitive Equilibrium. In a competitive equilibrium, budget constraint and good market
clearing imply Yi = Ei and Yi = å
n
j=1 Xij, respectively, for all countries i. Together with Equa-
tion (5), these two conditions imply
Yi = å
n
j=1
￿
Yitij
￿￿# cij
å
n
l=1
￿
Yltlj
￿￿# clj
Yj. (6)
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equations is redundant. Thus income levels are only determined up to a constant. Once income
levels are known, expenditure levels, E￿fEig, can be computed using budget constraint and
bilateral trade ﬂows, X￿
￿
Xij
￿
, can be computed using the gravity equation. This concludes the
description of the Armington model.
2.2 Counterfactual Analysis
We now illustrate how the gravity equation can be used to quantify the welfare consequences
of globalization. For simplicity, we focus on a shock to trade costs from t￿
￿
tij
￿
to t0￿
n
t0
ij
o
.
The same analysis generalizes in a straightforward manner to preference and endowment shocks.
To quantify the welfare consequences of a trade shock in a given country j, we proceed in two
steps. First, we show how changes in real consumption, Cj￿Ej/Pj, can be inferred from changes
in macro variables, X and Y. Second, we show how to compute changes in macro variables.
Welfare. In this chapter, whenever we refer to welfare changes in country j, we refer to percentage
changes in real consumption. Such changes correspond to the equivalent variation associated
with a foreign shock (expressed as a share of expenditure before the shock). Namely, percentage
changes in real consumption measures the percentage change in income that the representative
agent would be willing to accept in lieu of the shock to happen.
The ﬁrst result that we establish is that changes in real consumption can be inferred using only
two statistics: (i) observed changes in the share of expenditure on domestic goods, ljj ￿ Xjj/Ej;
and (ii) the trade elasticity in the gravity equation, #.
Let us start by considering an inﬁnitesimal change in trade costs from t to t + dt. By Shep-
hard’s Lemma, we know that
dlnPj = å
n
i=1 lijdlnPij,
where lij￿Xij/Ej denotes the share of expenditure on goods from country i in country j. Since
consumption is chosen to minimize expenditure, changes in consumption levels, Cij, only have
second-order effects on the consumer price index in country j. Under the assumption of CES
utility, changes in the consumer price index in country j can be rearranged further into changes
into domestic and import prices
dlnPj = ljjdlnPjj +
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
dlnPM
j ,
where PM
j ￿
h
åi6=j P1￿s
ij
i1/(1￿s)
is the component of the price index associated with imports. By
differentiating Equation (4), one can also show that
dln
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
￿ dlnljj = (1￿ s)
￿
dlnPM
j ￿ dlnPjj
￿
.
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￿
1￿ ljj
￿
dln
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
with the two previous, we get
dlnPj = dlnPjj ￿
￿
dlnljj/(1￿ s)
￿
. (7)
Thus, changes in real consumption, Cj￿Ej/Pj, in country j are given by
dlnCj =
￿
dlnEj ￿ dlnPjj
￿
+
￿
dlnljj/(1￿ s)
￿
. (8)
Since there are no domestic trade costs, tjj = t0
jj = 1, and trade is balanced, Yj = Ej, Equation
(3) implies that the ﬁrst term is equal to zero. In the simple Armington model, changes in real
consumption only depends on the change in the relative price of imported versus domestic goods,
PM
j /Pjj, which depends on the share of expenditure on domestic goods, ljj, and the elasticity of
substitution, s. Using Equations (8) and the deﬁnition of the trade elasticity # ￿ s ￿ 1, we get
dlnCj = ￿dlnljj/#.
Since the previous expression holds for any inﬁnitesimal shock, the welfare consequences of large
changes from t to t0 can be inferred by integrating the previous formula:
ˆ Cj = ˆ l
￿1/#
jj , (9)
where ˆ v ￿ v0/v denotes the proportional change in any variable v between the initial and coun-
terfactual equilibria. This establishes that for any change in trade costs, two statistics—the trade
elasticity, #, and the changes in the share of expenditure on domestic goods, ljj—are sufﬁcient to
infer welfare changes.1
Macroeconomic variables. At this point, we have shown that conditional on the trade elasticity,
#, changes in real consumption are exclusively determined by changes in ljj. We now describe
how one can use gravity models to predict how trade shocks affect trade ﬂows, in general, and the
share of expenditure on domestic goods, ljj, in particular. The approach that we will describe has
been popularized recently by Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008). One can think of this approach as
an “exact” version of Jones’ hat algebra for reasons that will be clear in a moment.2
Let lij￿Xij/ål Xlj denote the share of expenditure on goods from country i in country j. Since
the gravity equation holds both in the initial and the counterfactual equilibria, we have
ˆ lij =
￿ ˆ Yiˆ tij
￿￿#
å
n
l=1 llj
￿ ˆ Ylˆ tlj
￿￿#. (10)
1Since the previous result is based on Shepard’s Lemma and the fact that domestic prices are unaffected by the
shock, dlnPjj = 0, Equation (9) would also hold in the case of a shock to foreign preferences or endowments.
2Application of this approach can also be found in the older CGE literature; see e.g. Rutherford (2002).
6In the counterfactual equilibrium, Equation (6) further implies
Y0
j = å
n
i=1 l0
jiY0
i.
Combining the two previous expressions, we then get
ˆ YjYj = å
n
i=1
lji
￿ ˆ Yjˆ tji
￿￿# ˆ YiYi
å
n
l=1 lli
￿ ˆ Ylˆ tli
￿￿#. (11)
Although trade costs, endowments, and preference shifters affect bilateral trade ﬂows, as captured
by tij and cij in equation (5), Equation (11) shows that we can compute counterfactual changes in
income, ˆ Y￿
￿ ˆ Yi
￿
, as the solution of a system of non-linear equations without having to estimate
any of these parameters. All we need to determine changes in income levels (up to normalization)
are the initial expenditure shares, lij, the initial income levels, Yi, and the trade elasticity, #. Given
changes in income levels, changes in the shares of expenditure on goods from different countries,
ˆ lij, and changes in real consumption, ˆ Cj, can then be computed using Equations (9) and (10).
2.3 Trade Theory with Numbers: A Preview
In order to illustrate the usefulness of the simple Armington model, we focus on a very particular,
but important counterfactual exercise: moving to autarky. Formally, we assume that variable trade
costs in the new equilibrium are such that t0
ij = +¥ for any pair of countries i 6= j. All other
structural parameters are the same as in the initial equilibrium. For this particular shock, we do
not need to solve any non-linear system of equations to do counterfactual analysis. Since the share
of expenditure on domestic goods must be equal to 1 in the counterfactual equilibrium, l0
jj = 1,
we immediately know that ˆ ljj = 1/ljj.
Throughout this chapter we deﬁne the gains from international trade in country j, Gj, as the
absolute value of the percentage change in real income that would be associated with moving to
autarky in country j. Using Equation (9) and the fact that ˆ ljj = 1/ljj, we get
Gj = 1￿ l1/#
jj . (12)
In order to compute Gj we need measures of the trade elasticity, #, and the share of expenditure
on domestic goods, ljj. There are many econometric issues associated with estimating #; see e.g.
Hummels and Hillberry (2012). A simple way to estimate the trade elasticity # is to take the log of
the gravity equation (5) and run a cross-sectional regression of the following form
lnXij = dX
i + dM
j ￿ #lntij + dij, (13)
where the ﬁrst term dX
i ￿ lnci ￿ #lnYi is treated as an exporter ﬁxed-effect; the second term
dM
j ￿ lnYj ￿ ln
h
å
n
l=1 cl
￿
Yltlj
￿￿#i
is treated as an importer ﬁxed-effect; and the third term dij is
7treated as measurement error in trade ﬂows that is orthogonal to lntij. At this point we set # = 5,
which is a typical value used in the literature; see e.g. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) and
Head and Mayer (2013). We will come back to the sensitivity of our quantitative results to values
of the trade elasticity in Section 5.
In order to measure ljj in the data, recall that ljj ￿ Xjj/Ej = 1 ￿ åi6=j Xij/å
n
i=1 Xij. We can
measure åi6=j Xij as total imports by country j, whereas åi Xij is total expenditure by country j.
In this exercise as well as all subsequent exercises, we use data from the World Input-Output
Database (WIOD) in 2008. The database covers 27 EU countries and 13 other major countries; see
Timmer (2012).3 The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports the gains from trade Gj for these countries
using Equation (12). According to the simple Armington model, we see that gains from trade
are below 2% for three countries: Brazil (1.5%), Japan (1.7%), and the United States (1.8%). Not
surprisingly, gains from trade tend to be larger for smaller countries. The largest predicted gains
are for Slovakia (7.6%), Ireland (8.0%) and Hungary (8.1%). Given the strong assumptions that
have been imposed in Section 2.1, these numbers, of course, should be taken with more than a
grain of salt. We now discuss how richer and more realistic models would affect the magnitude of
the gains from trade.
3 Beyond Armington
The Armington model is very tractable, which has made it the go-to trade model for quantitative
work in policy institutions for more than forty years. This is also a very stylized model, which has
lead to quite a bit of skepticism about the robustness of its counterfactual predictions in academic
circles for about as many years. Fortunately, one can maintain the tractability of the Armington
model, without maintaining the somewhat ad-hoc assumption that each country is exogenously
endowed with a distinct good. As discussed below, the gravity equation (5), which is the basis for
counterfactual analysis in the Armington model, can be shown to hold under various assumptions
about technology and market structure. While each gravity model remains special, in the sense
that strong functional form assumptions are required for a gravity equation to hold, the ability of
these new models to match a large number of micro-level facts, together with the elegance of their
microtheoretical foundations, has lead to an explosion of quantitative work in international trade
over the last ten years.
In this section we explore how various features of more complex gravity models—market
structure, ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, multiple sectors, intermediate goods, and multiple factors of
production—affect the gains from trade as deﬁned in Section 2.3. Throughout our analysis we
3The mapping between the simple Armington model presented here and the data is not trivial for two reasons: (i)
it assumes the share of expenditures on intermediate goods is zero and (ii) it assumes that trade is balanced. This
implies that GDP is equal to gross output and that total expenditure is equal to GDP. Neither is true in the data. We
will deal with intermediate goods and trade imbalances explicitly in Sections 3.4 and 5.1, respectively. Here, as well as
in Section 3, we derive and apply our formulas for gains from trade ignoring trade imbalances. If moving to autarky
also implies the closing of trade imbalances, our formulas capture the change in real income rather than the change in
real expenditure. See online Appendix for details.
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ﬂows and trade elasticities. Thus different models may lead to different predictions about the
magnitude of the gains from trade because they predict different counterfactual autarky equilib-
ria, not because they predict different trade volumes in the initial equilibrium. In short, trade
volumes are taken as data that discipline the behavior of all models, irrespectively of what their
particular micro-theoretical foundations may be.4
As explained in the Introduction, although a move to autarky is an extreme comparative statics
exercise, it should be viewed as a useful benchmark to study the importance, in a well-deﬁned
welfare sense, of various economic channels discussed in the literature. We leave the evaluation
of trade policy to Section 4 in which we show how to use the exact hat algebra to conduct richer
comparative static exercises.
3.1 Many Models, One Equation
The gravity equation (5) has been shown to hold under perfect competition, as in Eaton and Ko-
rtum (2002); under Bertrand competition, as in Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003); under
monopolistic competition with homogeneous ﬁrms, as in Krugman (1980); and under monopo-
listic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, as in Chaney (2008), Arkolakis (2010), Arkolakis,
Demidova, Klenow, and Rodríguez-Clare (2008), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). Our
goal in this subsection is not to describe each of these models in detail, but rather highlight the
common features that will lead to a gravity equation as well as the key differences that may affect
the magnitude of the gains from trade. Detailed discussions of the microfoundations and func-
tional form assumptions leading to gravity equations can be found in Anderson (2010), Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), Head and Mayer (2013), as well as in our online Appendix.
Like the simple Armington model, the alternative gravity models mentioned above assume
the existence of a representative agent with CES utility in each country as well as balanced trade,
Ei = Yi.5 The representative agent, however, now has preferences over a continuum of goods or
varieties w 2 W:
Cj =
￿Z
w2W
cj(w)(s￿1)/sdw
￿s/(s￿1)
,
with s > 1. In equilibrium, each good w is only imported from one country so that Equation (1)
still holds with the aggregate consumption of goods from country i in country j being given by
Cij =
R
w2Wij cj(w)(s￿1)/sdw, where Wij ￿ W denotes the set of goods that country j buys from
country i, and yij = 1 for all country pairs due to the symmetry across varieties. For the same
reason, Equation (2) holds as well with the aggregate price of goods from country i in country j
being given by Pij =
￿R
w2Wij pj(w)1￿sdw
￿1/(1￿s)
and yij = 1 for all i and j.
4In order to match the same cross-section of trade ﬂows, different gravity models may implictly rely on different
values of bilateral trade costs as well as other structural parameters.
5In recent work, Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) have developed a gravity model with-
out CES utility. We discuss the implications of such a model in Section 3.6.
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mentioned above is that, due to different assumptions on technology and market structure, Wij is
no longer exogenously given. In these richer models, ﬁrms from country i may now decide to stop
producing and selling a subset of goods in country j if it is not proﬁtable for them to do so. Hence
changes in prices, Pij, may reﬂect both: (i) changes at the intensive margin, i.e., changes in the
price of goods imported in country j, pj(w), and (ii) changes at the extensive margin, i.e., changes
in the set of good imported in country j, Wij, due either to the selection of a different subset of
ﬁrms from i in j or the entry of a different set of ﬁrms in i. Mathematically, these new economic
considerations lead to the following generalization of Equation (3):
Pij = tijc
p
i |{z}
Intensive Margin
￿
0
@
 
Ej
cx
ij
! d
1￿s tijc
p
i
Pj
1
A
h
| {z }
Extensive Margin: Selection
￿
￿
Ri
ce
i
￿ d
1￿s
| {z }
Extensive Margin: Entry
￿ xij, (14)
where c
p
i , ce
i, and cx
ij are endogenous variables that capture how input prices affect variable costs
of production, ﬁxed entry costs, and ﬁxed exporting costs, respectively; Ej ￿ å
n
i=1 Xij still denotes
total expenditure in country j; Ri ￿ åj Xij denotes total sales or revenues for producers; and x ij >
0 is a function of structural parameters distinct from variable trade costs, tij, such as endowments
or ﬁxed exporting costs. The last two parameters, d and h, will play a central role in our analysis.
The parameter d is a dummy variable that characterizes the market structure: it is equal to one
under monopolistic competition with free entry and zero under perfect or Bertrand competition.6
The parameter h ￿ 0 is related to the extent of heterogeneity across varieties as we discuss more
formally below.
In the rest of this chapter we will use Equation (14) to organize the literature and explain
how different assumptions about technology and market structure—namely, different assump-
tions about c
p
i , ce
i, cx
ij, d, and h—may lead to different macro-level predictions without getting lost
into the algebra through which Equation (14) comes about. At this point, it is therefore important
to clarify how each term in Equation (14) relates to previous work in the literature.
The ﬁrst term, tijc
p
i , captures price changes at the intensive margin. This is the only active
margin in the Armington model. In that model, c
p
i = Yi, d = 0, and h = 0; see Equation (3).
This intensive margin will remain active in all models that we study. In most of these models, c
p
i
will also remain equal to total income Yi in country i. This is the case, for instance, if labor is the
only factor of production. In this situation, production costs are proportional to wages, which are
proportional to countries’ total income.
The second term,
￿￿
Ej/cx
ij
￿ d
1￿s
tijc
p
i /Pj
￿h
, captures changes at the extensive margin due to
selection effects. If h = 0, then this term is equal to one and there are no selection effects. This
occurs in models of monopolistic competition without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity and ﬁxed export-
6For expositional purposes, we often abuse terminology in this chapter and simply refer to the case d = 1 and d = 0
as “monopolistic competition” and “perfect competition,” respectively.
10ing costs, like Krugman (1980), in which all ﬁrms always export. The case h > 0 captures instead
situations in which a subset of ﬁrms from country i may start or stop exporting when market con-
ditions change in country j. Speciﬁcally, in models of perfect competition, like Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Bertrand competition, like Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), or monopolistic
competition à la Melitz (2003), like Chaney (2008), Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and Rodríguez-
Clare (2008), Arkolakis (2010), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011), if ﬁrms from country i are
less competitive relative to other ﬁrms serving market j, i.e., tijc
p
i /Pj is high, then less ﬁrms from
country i will serve this market, which will lead to a decrease in the number of varieties from i
available in j and an increase in Pij. In the previous models, the magnitude of selection effects
is formally determined by h ￿
￿ q
s￿1
￿￿
1+ 1￿s
q
￿
, where q > s ￿ 1 is the shape parameter of the
distribution of productivity draws across varieties. Under perfect and Bertrand competition, this
distribution is Fréchet. Under monopolistic competition, it is Pareto. In both cases, q measures the
elasticity of the mass of goods produced domestically with respect to their relative cost; 1/(1￿ s)
measures the elasticity of the price index with respect to new goods; and
￿
1+ 1￿s
q
￿
corrects for
the fact that the marginal variety has a higher price than the average variety. In models of monop-
olistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003) (d = 1,h > 0), selection also
depends on the size of market j relative to the ﬁxed costs of exporting from i to j, which is reﬂected
in
￿
Ej/cx
ij
￿ d
1￿s
. The nature of cx
ij depends on where ﬁxed exporting costs are paid. If they are paid
in the exporting country, then cx
ij is proportional to total income, Yi, in country i. If they are paid
in the importing country, then cx
ij is proportional to total income, Yj, in country j.
The third term,
￿
Ri/ce
i
￿ d
1￿s, captures changes at the extensive margin due to entry effects. This
last channel is speciﬁc to models with monopolistic competition and free entry (d = 1), whether
or not they feature ﬁrm-level heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003).7 In such environments, countries
in which entry is more proﬁtable, i.e., Ri/ce
i is high, export more varieties to all countries, which
decreases the price index with an elasticity 1/(s ￿ 1). If entry costs are paid in terms of labor, as
in Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003), ce
i is simply proportional to total income Yi in country i.
To sum up, starting from Equation (14), we can turn off and on the selection effects associated
with heterogeneity across varieties by setting h to 0 or not. Similarly, we can turn off and on
the scale effects associated with monopolistic competition and free entry by setting d to 0 or 1.
In the next subsections, we study how much these considerations—as well as the introduction
of multiple sectors, tradable intermediate goods, and multiple factors of production—affect the
overall magnitude of the gains from trade.
7Without free entry,
￿
Ri/ce
i
￿ d
1￿s would be absent from Equation (14) and one would need, in general, to take into
account the effect of trade on proﬁts; see e.g. Ossa (2011a). In the one-sector case reviewed in the next subsection,
this distinction turns out to be irrelevant, as shown in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). With multiple
sectors, however, free entry leads to home market effects, with implications for the magnitude of the gains from trade.
113.2 One Sector
It is standard to interpret models with CES utility, such as those presented in Section 3.1, as one-
sector models with a continuum of varieties; see e.g. Helpman and Krugman (1985). Here we
focus on such models since they are the closest to the Armington model described in Section 2.1.
Later we will consider multi-sector extensions of these models as well as incorporate tradable
intermediate goods and multiple factors of production.
In line with the existing literature, we assume that, in addition to Equation (14), the two fol-
lowing conditions hold: (i) c
p
i = cx
ii = ce
i = Yi, which reﬂects the fact that all factors of production
are used in the same proportions to produce, export, and develop all varieties; and (ii) Ri = Yi,
which reﬂects the fact that trade in goods is balanced.8 Under these two conditions, Equation (14)
simpliﬁes into
Pij = tijYi
0
@
 
Ej
cx
ij
! d
1￿s tijYi
Pj
1
A
h
xij, (15)
Note that Ri = Yi = ce
i implies that, like in the Armington model, there are no entry effects
associated with changes in trade costs, even under monopolistic competition. Since Equation (1)
still holds, bilateral trade ﬂows between country i and country j are still given by Equation (4).
Combining this observation with Equation (15), the gravity equation generalizes to
Xij =
￿
Yitij
￿￿# ￿
cx
ij
￿￿dh
cij
å
n
l=1
￿
Yltlj
￿￿# ￿
cx
lj
￿￿dh
clj
Ej. (16)
Compared to the Armington model, here # = (1+ h)(s ￿ 1) and cij ￿ x1￿s
ij . Thus if there are
selection effects, i.e., if h 6= 0, the structural interpretation of the trade elasticity is no longer
the same as in the Armington model. This reﬂects the fact that changes in variable trade costs
now affect both the price of existing varieties (intensive margin) and the set of varieties sold from
country i to country j (extensive margin). Nevertheless, we can still take the logs of both sides
of Equation (4) and estimate the trade elasticity # as we did in Section 2.3. In other words, the
mapping between bilateral trade data, X, and the trade elasticity, #, remains unchanged.9 Finally,
we see that changes in the magnitude of ﬁxed exporting costs, as captured by
￿
cx
ij
￿￿dh
, now affect
bilateral trade ﬂows under monopolistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity à la Melitz
(2003), i.e., if d = 1, h > 0.10 This extra term—which depends on whether ﬁxed exporting costs
8Since some of the models that we consider involve ﬁxed exporting costs paid in the importing country, i.e. trade in
exporting services, the assumption that overall trade is balanced, Ei = Yi, is different from the assumption that trade
in goods is balanced, Ri = Yi. The latter condition corresponds to the macro-level restriction R1 in Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodríguez-Clare (2012).
9This assumes that measures of trade costs are invariant across models. This is a reasonable assumption in the case
of import tariffs, but not in the case of price gaps; see Simonovska and Waugh (2012). We come back to the speciﬁc
issues associated with import tariffs in Section 4.
10Equation (16) is a special case of the macro-level restriction R3 in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012).
Compared to Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), we no longer need to impose explictly that proﬁts are
12are paid in the importing country, the exporting country, or both—opens up the possibility of
different predictions across gravity models, as we explain below.
Like in Section 2.2, consider a change in variable trade costs from t ￿
￿
tij
￿
to t0 ￿
n
t0
ij
o
,
though the same analysis easily extends to shocks to foreign endowments or technology, i.e.,
changes in c￿
n
cij
o
. Given CES utility, Equation (8) still holds. The key difference compared
to our previous analysis is that dlnEj ￿ dlnPjj is no longer equal to zero. Because of selection
effects, a change in variable trade costs may lead to a change in the set of goods produced do-
mestically, Wjj, and so to a change in the aggregate price index associated with these goods, Pjj,
relative to total expenditure in country j. Speciﬁcally, since Ej = Yj and cx
jj = Yj, Equation (15)
implies
dlnPjj = (1+ h)dlnYj ￿ hdlnPj.
Using the previous expression with Equation (7), which still holds because of CES utility, and the
trade balance condition, Ej = Yj, we then get
dlnEj ￿ dlnPjj = ￿(h/(h + 1)) ￿
￿
dlnljj/(1￿ s)
￿
. (17)
In models featuring selection effects (h > 0), a positive terms-of-trade shock, dlnljj/(1￿ s) > 0,
is accompanied by a negative shock to real consumption of domestic goods, dlnEj ￿ dlnPjj < 0.
Intuitively, a positive terms-of-trade shock tends to decrease the proﬁtability of domestic ﬁrms on
the domestic market, which leads to a decrease in the number of goods produced domestically,
and, given the love of varieties embedded in CES utility functions, an increase in the aggregate
price index associated with these goods.
Together with # = (1+ h)(s ￿ 1), Equations (8) and (17) imply dlnCj = ￿dlnljj/#. Like in
the Armington model, the previous expression can be integrated to get Equation (9).11 Thus, as
established in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), changes in the share of expendi-
ture on domestic goods, ljj, and the trade elasticity, #, remain two sufﬁcient statistics for welfare
analysis. In particular, gains from trade remain given by Equation (12). In short, conditional on
observed trade ﬂows and the trade elasticity, selection and scale effects have no impact on the
overall magnitude of the gains from trade.
The fact that ljj remains the only macro variable that matters for welfare is intuitive enough:
it measures the magnitude of the terms-of-trade effect and changes in real output themselves
are function of changes in the overall price index, which also depends on the magnitude of the
terms-of-trade effect. The fact that the only structural parameter that matters can be recovered as
the trade elasticity # from a gravity equation, by contrast, heavily relies on the fact that selection
effects, as captured by h, are identical across countries. It is this assumption that simultaneously
generates a gravity equation and guarantees that the trade elasticity in that equation is the relevant
proportional to revenues. This restriction is implicit in Equation (15).
11A more direct, though perhaps less illuminating way of establishing Equation (9) consists in computing Pjj from
Equation (15) and substituting for it in ljj =
￿
Pjj/Pj
￿1￿s
.
13elasticity for welfare analysis. It is worth noting that this result does not rely on the fact that new
varieties have zero welfare effects. In the models with monopolistic competition considered here,
a shock to trade costs, foreign endowments, or foreign technology, may very well increase welfare
through its effects at the extensive margin. The point rather is that these effects, no matter how
large they are, can always be inferred from changes in aggregate trade ﬂows.
The previous equivalence only establishes that conditional on a change in ljj and #, alternative
gravity models must predict the same welfare change as the Armington model, but, in principle,
they may predict different changes in the share of domestic expenditure for a given trade shock.
Under the additional assumption that ﬁxed exporting costs (if any) are paid in the destination
country—cx
ij = cx
j , asinEaton, Kortum, andKramarz(2011)—onecanshowastrongerequivalence
result. In that case, cx
ij drops out of Equation (16). Thus the counterfactual changes in trade
ﬂows and income levels associated with changes in variable trade costs can still be computed
using the exact hat algebra of Section 2.2, i.e. Equations (10) and (11). Given observable macro
variables in the initial equilibrium, X and Y, and a value of the trade elasticity, #, this implies
that counterfactual predictions for macro variables and welfare are exactly the same as in the
Armingtonmodel.12 Thisstrongerequivalenceresult, however, isverysensitivetotheassumption
that ﬁxed exporting costs are paid in the importing country. If ﬁxed exporting costs are partly paid
in the origin country, then one-sector gravity models with monopolistic competition and ﬁrm-
level heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003) generally predict different changes in relative factor prices,
i.e., relative wages if labor is the only factor of production. This leads to different changes in the
share of expenditure on domestic goods and, in turn, different welfare changes for a given change
in trade costs (moving to autarky being a notable exception).13
3.3 Multiple Sectors
Gravity models can be extended to multiple sectors, s = 1,...,S, by assuming a two-tier utility
function in which the upper-level is Cobb-Douglas and the lower-level is CES; see e.g. Anderson
and Yotov (2010), Donaldson (2008), Caliendo and Parro (2010), Costinot, Donaldson, and Ko-
munjer (2010), Hsieh and Ossa (2011), Levchenko and Zhang (2011), Ossa (2012), Shikher (forth-
cominga), and Shikher (forthcomingb). Formally let us assume that the representative agent in
12In this special case, one can show that the welfare impact of changes in the number of domestic varieties (if any)
exactlycompensatesthewelfareimpactofchangesinthenumberofforeignvarieties(ifany), asemphasizedinFeenstra
(2010). In general, i.e., if ﬁxed costs are partly paid in the origin country, these exact offsetting effects no longer hold,
though the welfare change associated with a shock to variable trade costs remains given by Equation (9), as discussed
above. Similarly, in the case of shocks to foreign endowments or technology, these exact offsetting effects no longer
hold, though welfare changes remain given by Equation (9), as shown in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare
(2012). In short, the main equivalence result in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) does not hinge on these
exact offsetting effects.
13For ﬁnite changes in trade costs, different counterfactual predictions do not arise from selection effects per se, but
rather from the fact that ﬁxed exporting costs, if paid at least partly in the origin country, can affect relative demand
for factors of production in different countries and so relative factor prices. To see this, note that in a symmetric world
economy in which relative factor prices are constant, cx
ij would be constant across countries as well. Thus, in spite of
selection effects, cx
ij would again drop out of Equation (16), leading to the same counterfactual predictions as in the
Armington model.
14each country aims to maximize
Cj = Õ
S
s=1 C
bj,s
j,s , (18)
where bj,s ￿ 0 are exogenous preference parameters satisfying å
S
s=1 bj,s = 1 and Cj,s is total con-
sumption of the composite good s in country j,
Cj,s =
￿Z
w2W
cj,s(w)(ss￿1)/ssdw
￿ss/(ss￿1)
, (19)
where ss > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between different varieties, which is allowed to
vary across sectors. In multi-sector gravity models, each variety remains sourced from only one
country so that a sector level version of (1) still holds, Cj,s =
￿
å
n
i=1 C
(ss￿1)/ss
ij,s
￿ss/(ss￿1)
, with
Cij,s =
R
w2Wij,s cj,s(w)(ss￿1)/ssdw. The associated consumer price index is Pj = Õ
S
s=1 P
bj,s
j,s , with
sector-speciﬁc price indices given by a sector level version of (2), Pj,s =
￿
å
n
i=1 P
1￿ss
ij,s
￿1/(1￿ss)
, with
Pij,s =
￿R
w2Wij,s pj,s(w)(1￿ss)dw
￿1/(1￿ss)
.
In line with the literature, we assume that our reduced-form assumption on price indices,
Equation (14), now holds sector-by-sector; that factors of production are used in the same way
across all activities in all sectors, so that c
p
i,s = cm
ii,s = ce
i,s = Yi; and that trade in goods is balanced,
Ri = Yi.14 Combining these assumptions, we get
Pij,s = tij,sYi
2
4
 
ej,s
Ej
cx
ij,s
! ds
1￿ss tij,sYi
Pj,s
3
5
hs
r
ds
1￿ss
i,s xij,s. (20)
where ej,s ￿ Ej,s/Ej denotes the share of total expenditure in country j allocated to sector s and
ri,s = Ri,s/Ri denote the share of total revenues in country i generated from sector s. All other
variableshave thesame interpretationas inSection 3.1, except thatthey arenow freeto varyacross
sectors. Compared to Equation (15), Equation (20) allows for scale effects in monopolistically
competitive sectors both through selection,
￿
ej,sEj/cx
ij,s
￿ ds
1￿ss , and entry, r
ds
1￿ss
i,s . In the one-sector
case, the latter effect is necessarily absent because ri,s = 1. Here an expansion of production in a
monopolistically competitive sector, i.e. a higher value of ri,s, leads to entry and gains from new
varieties, i.e. a lower value of Pij,s, with the standard “love of variety” elasticity of 1/(ss ￿ 1).15
We now focus on the gains from international trade, as deﬁned in Section 2.3, and discuss how
they are affected by the introduction of multiple sectors under the assumption that Equation (20)
holds. Bilateral trade ﬂows at the sector-level satisfy Xij,s =
￿
Pij,s/Pj,s
￿1￿ss ej,sEj. Together with
14The assumption, Ri = Yi, is stronger than in the one-sector case. In Section 3.2, it holds in models with monopolistic
competition and ﬁrm-level heterogeneity independently of where ﬁxed exporting costs are paid, as long as productivity
distributions are Pareto. In a multi-sector environment, this may no longer be true even under Pareto if ﬁxed exporting
costs are partly paid in the importing country and sectors differ in the share of revenues associated with ﬁxed exporting
costs. Such considerations lead to a slight change in the present analysis, which we come back to below.
15Similar scale effects can be introduced in the one sector case by allowing factor supply to be elastic; see Balistreri,
Hillberry, and Rutherford (2009). The magnitude of such effects then crucially depends on the elasticity of factor supply.
15Equation (20), this implies the sector-level gravity equation:
Xij,s =
￿
tij,sYi
￿￿#s
￿
cx
ij
￿￿dshs
r
ds
i,scij,s
ål
￿
tlj,sYl
￿￿#s
￿
cx
lj,s
￿￿dshs
r
ds
l,sclj,s
ej,sEj, (21)
where #s = (1+ hs)(ss ￿ 1) and cij,s ￿ x
1￿ss
ij,s . As in Section 3.1, one can combine Equation (20),
Equation (21), and the fact that ljj,s =
￿
Pjj,s/Pj,s
￿1￿ss to show that changes in real consumption
associated with a trade shock are now given by:
ˆ Cj = Õ
S
s=1
￿
ˆ ljj,s
￿
ˆ e
hs
j,sˆ rj,s
￿￿ds
￿￿bj,s/#s
. (22)
Under Cobb-Douglas preferences, we know that ej,s = e0
j,s = bj,s. Thus the previous expression
can be simpliﬁed further into ˆ Cj = Õ
S
s=1
￿
ˆ ljj,sˆ r
￿ds
j,s
￿￿bj,s/#s
.16 To compute the gains from trade, we
only need to solve for ˆ rj,s when the counterfactual entails autarky. Since r0
j,s = e0
j,s under autarky
and ej,s = e0
j,s = bj,s, we must have ˆ rj,s = ej,s/rj,s. Using the fact that ˆ ljj,s = 1/ljj,s for all s, we
then get
Gj = 1￿ Õ
S
s=1
 
ljj,s
￿
ej,s
rj,s
￿ds
!bj,s/#s
. (23)
Since ds appears in Equation (23), gains from trade predicted by multi-sector gravity models with
monopolistic competition differ from those predicted by models with perfect competition because
of scale effects, as discussed in Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). In contrast, se-
lection effects still have no impact on the overall magnitude of the gains from trade. Since hs does
not appear in Equation (23), conditional on observed trade ﬂows and the trade elasticity, the gains
from trade predicted by monopolistically competitive gravity models with and without ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity are the same, even with multiple sectors.
To compute the gains from trade using Equation (23), we need measures of ljj,s, ej,s, bj,s and
rj,s as well as sector-level trade elasticities #s for s = 1,...,S. To compute ljj,s, ej,s, bj,s and rj,s, we
use data on 31 sectors from the WIOD in 2008, as explained in the Appendix.17 Trade elasticities
for agriculture and manufacturing sectors are from Caliendo and Parro (2010) while the trade
elasticity for service sectors is simply held equal to the aggregate elasticity used in Section 2.3, 5.18
For the purposes of this chapter, the main advantage of the estimation procedure in Caliendo and
Parro (2010) is that it is consistent with all quantitative trade models satisfying the sector-level
16Without balanced trade in goods, Rj 6= Yj, this would generalize to ˆ Cj = Õ
S
s=1
￿
ˆ ljj,s
￿
ˆ rj,s ˆ Rj/ ˆ Yj
￿￿ds
￿￿bj,s/#s
.
17In theory, since the models that we consider do not feature intermediate goods, we have ej,s = bj,s. In the data,
however, gross expenditure shares, ej,s, differ from ﬁnal demand shares, bj,s. In the analysis that follows we let bj,s be
different from ej,s when computing gains from trade using Equation (23).
18Since there is little trade in services, the value of that elasticity has very small effects on our quantitative results.
16gravity equation (21).19
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 reports the gains from trade Gj for the same set of countries as
in Section 2.3, but using Equation (23) rather than Equation (12). In Column 2, all sectors are
assumed to be perfectly competitive, ds = 0 for all s, while in Column 3, all agriculture and manu-
facturing sectors are assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Service sectors are assumed to
be perfectly competitive in both cases, an assumption that we maintain throughout this chapter.
Two features of these results stand out. First, even in an environment with active entry ef-
fects, such as the one considered here, there are no systematic differences between the gains from
trade predicted by multi-sector models with perfect competition, Column 2, and those predicted
by models with monopolistic competition, Column 3. For some countries the gains under mo-
nopolistic competition are larger than under perfect competition (e.g., gains in Germany increase
from 12.7% to 17.6%), while for other countries the opposite holds (e.g., gains for Greece decrease
from 16.3% to 4.7%). Second, the gains from trade predicted by multi-sector models under both
market structures, Columns 2 and 3, are signiﬁcantly larger than those predicted by one-sector
models, Column 1. For example, moving from Column 1 to Column 2 increases Gj for Belgium
from 7.5% to 32.7%, while it increases Gj for Canada from 3.8% to 17.4%. The average among all
the countries in Table 1 more than triples, increasing from 4.4% (Column 1) to 15.3% (Column 2),
a point also emphasized in Ossa (2012).
The fact that models with perfect and monopolistic competition predict, on average, similar
gains reﬂect the opposite consequences of entry effects—Õ
S
s=1
￿
ej,s/rj,s
￿bj,sds/#s in Equation (23)—
oncountrieswithacomparativeadvantageandacomparativedisadvantageinsectorswithstrong
scale effects. If ej,s/rj,s is negatively correlated with ds/#s, then country j tends to be a large ex-
porter of goods with strong scale effects. For such a country, the gains from trade tend to be larger
than in the absence of scale effects since trade allows specialization in the sectors characterized by
strong returns to scale. The converse is true, however, for a country in which ej,s/rj,s is positively
correlated with ds/#s, i.e., a country with a comparative disadvantage in sectors with strong scale
effects. In theory, such a country may even lose from opening up to trade. This idea is the basis
of Frank Graham’s argument for protection; see Ethier (1982a) and Helpman and Krugman (1985)
for a general discussion.
Why do multi-sector gravity models predict much larger gains than their one-sector counter-
parts? Part of the answer is: Cobb-Douglas preferences. This assumption implies that if the price
of a single good gets arbitrarily large as a country moves to autarky—because it cannot produce
that good—then gains from trade are inﬁnite. According to Equation (23), this will happen either
19Caliendo and Parro (2010) use COMTRADE data from 1993. They assume that iceberg trade costs can be decom-
posed into tij,s = tij,sdij,smij,s where tij,s is one plus the ad-valorem tariff applied by country j on good s imported
from i and dni is a symmetric component of the iceberg-trade cost, i.e., dij,s = dji,s. Taking a triple log-difference of
Equation(21) with ds = 0 yields
ln
Xij,sXjl,sXli,s
Xil,sXlj,sXji,s
= #s ln
tij,stjl,stli,s
til,stlj,stji,s
+ mijl,s.
where the error-term mijl,s = lnm#s
ij,scij,s + lnm#s
jl,scjl,s + lnm#s
li,scli,s ￿ lnm#s
il,scil,s ￿ lnm#s
lj,sclj,s ￿ lnm#s
ji,scji,s. We discuss
how we map WIOD and COMTRADE data in the online Appendix.
17if the share of expenditure on domestic goods, ljj,s, is close to zero—which implies arbitrarily
large costs of production for that good at home—or if the trade elasticity, #s, is close to zero—
which implies that foreign varieties are essential. We come back to this issue when discussing the
more general case of nested CES utility functions in Section 5.3.
3.4 Tradable Intermediate Goods
We now enrich the supply-side of gravity models by introducing tradable intermediate goods and
input-output linkages as in the early work of Krugman and Venables (1995), Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Alvarez and Lucas (2007), and more recently Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009), Caliendo
and Parro (2010), and Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011). Formally, we maintain the same
preference structure as in the previous section and introduce intermediate goods parsimoniously
by assuming that, in each sector s, they are produced in the exact same way as composite goods
for ﬁnal consumption:
Ij,s =
￿Z
w2W
ij,s(w)(ss￿1)/ssdw
￿ss/(ss￿1)
, (24)
where ij,s (w) denote the amount of variety w used in the production of intermediate goods in
country j and sector s. Accordingly, the sector-level price index Pj,s deﬁned in Section 3.3 now
measures the aggregate price of sector s goods in country j for both ﬁnal consumption and pro-
duction.
As we did in the previous section, and in line with the existing literature, we assume that
sector-level price indices satisfy Equation (14) and that trade in goods is balanced so that, together
with the overall trade balance, we have total expenditure equals total producer revenues, Ei =
Ri, in each country. Compared to Section 3.3, we allow c
p
i,s to vary across sectors to reﬂect the
differential effect of intermediate goods on unit costs of production in different sectors:
c
p
i,s = Y
1￿ai,s
i Õ
S
k=1 P
ai,ks
i,k , (25)
where ai,ks ￿ 0 are exogenous technology parameters such that ai,s ￿ åai,ks 2 [0,1]. As in the
previous section, we assume that all sectors use primary factors in the same way, hence the term
Yi in Equation (25). In line with the existing literature, we also assume that entry and exporting
activities also use intermediate goods in the same proportion as production, ce
i,s = cx
ii,s = c
p
i,s.20
Under the previous assumptions, Equation (14) now implies
Pij,s = tij,sci,s
2
4
 
ej,s
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ij,s
! ds
1￿ss tij,sci,s
Pj,s
3
5
hs ￿
ri,s
vi
Yi
ci,s
￿ ds
1￿ss
x ij,s, (26)
20Alternatively one could assume that entry and exporting activities only use primary factors of production:
ce
i,s = cx
ii,s = Yi. This assumption, however, immediately creates inconsistencies between the predictions of models
of monopolistic competition and our dataset. Given our estimates of the trade elasticities #s, the factor costs associated
with ﬁxed entry and exporting activities is sometimes higher than the total factor costs observed in the data.
18where ci,s = c
p
i,s as given by Equation (25); vi ￿ Yi/Ri is the ratio of total income to total revenues
in country i; and ei,s and ri,s still denote expenditure and revenue shares, the difference being
that expenditure and revenue are now “gross,” as they include the purchases and sales of both
consumption and intermediate goods. In the absence of intermediate goods we have ai,s = 0 and
vi = 1 for all i and s, so the previous equation reduces to (20).
Bilateraltradeﬂowsnowincludetradeinconsumptionandintermediategoods. Butsinceboth
are combined using the same CES aggregator, Equations (19) and (24), trade ﬂows still satisfy
Xij,s =
￿
Pij,s/Pj,s
￿1￿ss ej,sEj. Together with Equation (26), this implies the following sector-level
gravity equation:
Xij,s =
￿
tij,sci,s
￿￿#s
￿
cx
ij,s
￿￿dshs ￿
ri,s
vi
Yi
ci,s
￿ds
cij,s
å
n
l=1
￿
tlj,scl,s
￿￿#s
￿
cx
lj,s
￿￿dshs ￿
rl,s
vl
Yl
cl,s
￿ds
clj,s
ej,sEj, (27)
where again cij,s ￿ x
1￿ss
ij,s . One can now follow a similar strategy as in previous sections to show
that welfare changes associated with a foreign shock are given by
ˆ Cj = Õ
S
s,k=1
 
ˆ ljj,k
￿￿
ˆ ej,k
ˆ vj
￿hk ￿
ˆ rj,k
ˆ vj
￿￿￿dk
!￿bj,se aj,sk/#k
, (28)
where e aj,sk is the elasticity of the price index in sector s with respect to changes in the price index in
sector k. These price elasticities are given by the elements of the “adjusted Leontief inverse” of the
input-output matrix, i.e., the (S ￿ S) matrix
￿
Id ￿ e Aj
￿￿1
, with the elements of the e Aj matrix given
by the adjusted technology parameters e aj,sk ￿ aj,sk (1+ dk (1+ hk)/#k). Under perfect competi-
tion,
￿
Id ￿ e Aj
￿￿1
is the standard Leontief inverse matrix, i.e.,
￿
Id ￿ e Aj
￿￿1
=
￿
Id ￿ Aj
￿￿1 where
Aj is the matrix with typical element aj,sk. Under monopolistic competition with intermediate
goods used in entry and exporting activities, however, we need to adjust the technology para-
meters aj,sk by 1 + (1+ hk)/#k = 1 + 1/(sk ￿ 1) to take into account that a decline in the price
index of sector s not only decreases the price index of sector k through the standard input-output
channels, but also by lowering ﬁxed entry and exporting costs, thereby increasing the number of
available varieties.
In addition, intermediate goods affects the results derived in Section 3.3 in two important
ways. First, expenditure shares, ej,s, are no longer equal to exogenous consumption shares, bj,s.
Hence, ˆ ej,s may be different from one, which implies that the use of the formula given in Equation
(28) requires either observing ˆ ej,s, after the shock, or predicting it, before the shock. Second, the
scale effect term,
￿
ˆ ej,k/ˆ vj
￿hk ￿
ˆ rj,k/ˆ vj
￿
, now depends on the change in the ratio of value added to
gross output, ˆ vj. Intuitively, under monopolistic competition, welfare depends on entry, which
itself depends on the ratio of revenues to factor prices, vj.
The associated formula for the gains from international trade is obtained from (28) by setting
ˆ ljj,k = 1/ljj,k and by solving for
￿
ˆ ej,k
ˆ vj
￿hk ￿
ˆ rj,k
ˆ vj
￿
as we move to autarky. Since ej,k and rj,k are data
19while eA
j,k = rA
j,k in autarky, then we just need to solve for eA
j,k/vA
j . In the online Appendix we show
that this is given by eA
j,k/vA
j = å
S
l=1 bj,laj,kl, where aj,kl are now the elements of the Leontief inverse
￿
Id ￿ Aj
￿￿1. The gains from trade are then
Gj = 1￿ Õ
S
s,k=1
 
ljj,k
￿￿
ej,k
bj,k
￿hs rj,k
bj,k
￿￿dk
!bj,se aj,sk/#k
, (29)
where bj,k ￿ vj
￿
å
S
l=1 bj,laj,kl
￿
summarizes how intermediate goods affect the magnitude of scale
effects in models with monopolistic competition.
To implement the previous formula using the WIOD data, we compute ljj,s, Rj,s, Ej,s, rj,s, ej,s,
and bj,s in the exact same way as in Section 3.3. In the raw data, we also observe purchases, Xij,ks,
of intermediate goods from sector k and country i in sector s and country j. Using those, we can
then compute shares of intermediate purchases aj,ks = åi Xij,ks/Rj,s and value added by sector as
Yj,s = Rj,s ￿ åk åi Xij,ks. In a number of simulations below, we also follow Balistreri, Hillberry,
and Rutherford (2011) and use an alternative measure of shares of intermediate goods, a￿
j,ks =
￿
åk åi Xij,ks/Rj,s
￿
￿
￿
Ej,k/Ej
￿
, when computing gains from trade using Equation (29). Compared
to the true share, aj,ks, this alternative measure, a￿
j,ks, counterfactually assumes that ﬁrms allocate
expenditure on intermediate goods from different sectors in the same proportions, Ej,k/Ej, though
some sectors may have higher shares of intermediate goods, åk åi Xij,ks/Rj,s. We come back to the
beneﬁt of this simpliﬁcation in a moment.
Columns 4-7 of Table 1 report the gains from trade Gj under different market structures using
Equation (29). Column 4 corresponds to gains from trade under perfect competition, ds = 0 for
all s, using the true intermediate good shares, aj,ks = åi Xij,ks/Rj,s. We see that predicted gains
from trade are much higher than those predicted by the same models without intermediate goods
(Column 2). For example, the gains from trade for the United States and Spain in Column 4 are
twice as high as those in Column 2, while for Japan the gains increase by a factor of ﬁve. One can
think about these results in two ways. First, trade in intermediates leads to a decline in the price of
domestic goods, which implies additional welfare gains. If domestic goods are used as inputs in
domestic production, this triggers additional rounds of productivity gains, leading to even larger
gains; this is the input-output loop often mentioned in the literature.21 Second, for given data on
the share of expenditure on domestic goods, ljj,s, models featuring intermediate goods necessarily
predicts more trade relative to total income. So, perhaps, it should not be too surprising that the
same models predict that real income increases by more because of trade.
Ideally, one would like to study the predictions of models of monopolistic competition using
the same data on intermediate good shares, aj,ks. Unfortunately, this is not possible in the context
of our dataset since it would lead some of the elements of the adjusted Leontief matrix to become
21A simple way to illustrate this mechanism is to return to the one-sector model. In the case of perfect competition,
the formula above becomes Gj = 1 ￿
￿
ljj
￿1/#(1￿a)
; see Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas (2007). Thus
a higher share of intermediate goods, a, leads to higher gains from trade.
20negative, in which case gains from trade Gj are not well-deﬁned. To understand why this issue
arises, consider a simpler model with monopolistic competition, ds = 1, intermediate goods, as >
0, but only one sector, S = 1. In that environment, Equation (29) simpliﬁes to Gj = 1 ￿ l
e aj/#
jj ,
where e aj =
￿
1￿ aj
￿
1+ 1
s￿1
￿￿￿1
. As aj
￿
1+ 1
s￿1
￿
gets close to one, e aj goes to inﬁnity and real
consumption in autarky goes to zero. If aj ￿ (s ￿ 1)/s then the price index, real consumption
and of course Gj are not well-deﬁned. Intuitively, a given increase in the number of varieties leads
to a decline in the price index, which triggers a decline in the cost of entry, which, in turn, leads to a
further increase in the number of varieties. We obtain inﬁnite ampliﬁcation whenever the share of
intermediates in production, aj, is high relative to the love of variety, 1/(s ￿ 1). This is precisely
what happens when any of the elements of the adjusted Leontief matrix becomes negative.
To get around this issue, Columns 5-7 report gains from trade using the alternative measure of
intermediate good shares, a￿
j,ks, as in Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011). To make sure that
the difference between models of perfect and monopolistic competition is not being driven by a
different treatment of intermediate goods, Column 5 again reports the gains from trade under per-
fect competition. The results are very similar whether we use true shares (Column 4) or alternative
shares (Column 5). Column 6 reports gains from trade under monopolistic competition without
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, ds = 1 and hs = 0, whereas Column 7 reports gains under monopolistic
competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, ds = 1 and hs > 0. Following Balistreri, Hillberry, and
Rutherford (2011), we set hs = 0.65 for all s.22 In general, gains from trade are slightly higher with
monopolistic than perfect competition. For example, the gains for the US increase from 8% to 8.6%
as we move from Column 5 to Column 6 in Table 1. Across all countries, the average gains increase
from 27.1% to 32.3%. The intuition is simple. When entry activities use intermediate goods, trade
leads to a decline in the cost of entry and hence to an expansion in the variety of goods produced
domestically, bringing about additional welfare gains.
As shown by the results in Column 7, the gains from trade are even higher when we allow
for ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. To see why, recall that #s = (ss ￿ 1)(1+ hs), hence if #s = 3.2 (as in
the Chemicals sector), then hs = 0.65 implies ss = 2.9, whereas under the assumption hs = 0 we
would have concluded ss = 4.2. The difference in the implied elasticity of substitution ss between
models with and without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity leads to large differences in the magnitude of
the scale effects arising from love of variety. We come back to this issue in more detail in Section
5.3. For now, we merely want to point out that: (i) welfare calculations are highly sensitive to the
value of this parameter; and (ii) the reason behind this sensitivity is that conditional on the value
of the trade elasticity #s, the value of hs pins down ss and, in turn, the magnitude of scale effects.
In summary, the introduction of tradable intermediate goods dramatically increases the mag-
nitude of the gains from trade, both under perfect and monopolistic competition. Under the latter
market structure, the scale effects associated with decreases in the price of intermediate goods
22Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) use non-linear least squares to estimate the trade elasticity for manufac-
turing as a whole (as well as other parameters). Their preferred estimate is # = 4.58. Following Bernard, Eaton, Jensen,
and Kortum (2003), they set s = 3.8. Since # = (s ￿ 1)(1+ h), these two values imply that h = 0.65. In Section 5.3 we
discuss more direct ways to estimate hs across sectors using ﬁrm-level data.
21are so large that if one were to use the true shares of intermediate purchases across countries and
sectors, aj,ks, rather than a made-up average, a￿
j,ks, one would conclude that for all countries in our
dataset, gains from trade cannot be ﬁnite.
3.5 Multiple Factors of Production
So far, we have restricted ourselves to gravity models featuring only one factor of production,
or equivalently multiple factors of production that are used in the same proportions in all sectors.
ThisassumptionisformallyreﬂectedinthefactthatproducerpricesareproportionaltoGDP,Yi, in
Equations (20) and (25). In this section we introduce differences in factor intensity across sectors,
as in the extensions of Eaton and Kortum (2002), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), and
Melitz (2003) considered by Chor (2010), Burstein and Vogel (2010), and Bernard, Redding, and
Schott (2007), respectively.
For expositional purposes, we restrict ourselves to an economic environment in which there
are only two factors of production, skilled labor and unskilled labor, and no intermediate goods.
Throughout this subsection, we assume that aggregate production functions are CES in all coun-
tries and sectors and given by
Qj,s =
h
mH
s
￿
Hj,s
￿(r￿1)/r + mL
s
￿
Lj,s
￿(r￿1)/rir/(r￿1)
,
where Hj,s and Lj,s denote total employment of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, in
country j and sector s; r > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor;
and m
f
j > 0 determines the intensity of factor f = H, L in sector s, with mH
j,s + mF
j,s = 1. In line with
the existing literature, we also assume that factors of production have the same share in variable
costs of production as in entry and exporting costs (if any): ce
i,s = cm
ii,s = c
p
i,s ￿ ci,s. Assuming as
above that trade in goods is balanced, Yi = Ri, Equation (20) then generalizes to
Pij,s = tij,sci,s
2
4
 
ej,s
Ej
cx
ij,s
! ds
1￿ss tij,sci,s
Pj,s
3
5
hs ￿
ri,s
Yi
ci,s
￿ ds
1￿ss
x ij,s. (30)
All variables have the same interpretation as in previous sections, except for the fact that unit costs
are now proportional to
ci,s =
￿￿
mH
s
￿r ￿
wH
i
￿1￿r
+
￿
mL
s
￿r ￿
wL
i
￿1￿r￿1/(1￿r)
, (31)
where wH
i and wL
i are the wages of skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, in country i.
As in previous sections, if lower-level utility functions are CES, then gravity holds in this en-
22vironment. Combining Equations (19) and (30), we get
Xij,s =
￿
tij,sci,s
￿￿#s
￿
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￿ds
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ej,sEj.
For any trade shock, we can normalize factor prices such that Yj = Y0
j. Using this normalization,
we can then express welfare changes as
ˆ Cj = Õ
S
s=1
￿
ˆ cj,s
￿￿bj,s
￿
ˆ ljj,s
￿￿
ˆ cj,s
￿￿(1+hs) ˆ e
hs
j,sˆ rj,s
￿￿ds
￿￿bj,s/#s
.
Gains from trade, in turn, are given by
Gj = 1￿ Õ
S
s=1
￿
ˆ cA
j,s
￿￿bj,s
 
ljj,s
￿￿
ˆ cA
j,s
￿￿(1+hs) ej,s
rj,s
￿ds
!bj,s/#s
, (32)
where ˆ cA
j,s denote the change in production costs between the initial equilibrium and autarky.
Compared to one-factor models, changes in real consumption now also depend on changes in
relative factor prices, which affects production costs across sectors, as reﬂected in ˆ cj,s and ˆ cA
j,s. Un-
der perfect competition, such changes only affect variable costs of production, whereas under
monopolistic competition, they also affect the ﬁxed costs of exporting and entry and so, the num-
ber of available varieties in country j and sector s, as reﬂected in the extra terms
￿
ˆ cj,s
￿￿(1+hs) and
￿
ˆ cA
j,s
￿￿(1+hs)
.
In order to compute changes in production costs, one can again use the exact hat algebra in-
troduced in Section 2.2. We illustrate here how this can be done as we move from the initial
equilibrium to autarky, though the same methodology can be applied to any shock. Equation (31)
implies
ˆ cA
j,s =
￿
jH
j,s
￿
ˆ w
A,H
i
￿1￿r
+ jL
j,s
￿
ˆ w
A,L
i
￿1￿r￿1/(1￿r)
, (33)
where j
f
j,s ￿
￿
m
f
s
￿r ￿
w
f
j
￿1￿r
/c
1￿r
j,s is the share of total factor spending going to factor f in country
j and sector s in the initial equilibrium. Changes in factor prices, in turn, can be computed by
manipulating the two factor-market clearing conditions:
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23where hj,s ￿ Hj,s/H and lj,s ￿ Lj,s/L denote the share of skilled and unskilled workers, respec-
tively, employed in sector s in country j in the initial equilibrium, and yj,s ￿ Yj,s/Yj denotes the
share of total income earned in sector s in country j. Combining Equations (32)-(35), we can
compute the gains from trade in the multi-factor case.
To implement this new formula, we need additional data on the elasticity of substitution be-
tween skilled and unskilled workers, r, the share of employment of skilled and unskilled work-
ers across sectors, hj,s and lj,s, and the factor cost shares, j
f
j,s. For simplicity, we assume Cobb-
Douglas technologies, i.e., r = 1, and common cost shares across countries, i.e., j
f
j,s = j
f
s.23
We compute factor cost shares from the NBER manufacturing database that contains information
about employment and average wages for both production and non-production workers in the
United States between 1987 and 2005. Following Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994), we treat
skilled workers in the model as non-production workers in the data and unskilled workers in the
model as production workers in the data. Given cost shares, employment shares are computed
as hj,s =
jH
s yj,s
åk jH
k yj,k and lj,s =
jL
s yj,s
åk jL
kyj,k. Since we do not have data on cost shares for sectors outside
of manufacturing, we aggregate all non-manufacturing sectors into a single sector which we as-
sume is non-tradable and which has factor cost shares equal to the overall factor cost shares in
manufacturing.
When computing the gains from trade using Equation (32) under the assumption of perfection
competition, ds = 0 for all s, we ﬁnd gains from trade that are virtually the same as those presented
in Column 2. This reﬂects the fact that the factor content of trade for skilled and unskilled labor
is basically zero in our dataset. In particular, one can check that under the assumption that pro-
duction functions are Cobb-Douglas (r = 1), we have ˆ w
A,f
j =
ås ej,sm
f
s
ås yj,sm
f
s
￿ 1. At this point, thus, it
does not appear that, conditional on observed trade ﬂows, allowing for standard Heckscher-Ohlin
forces has large effects on the magnitude of the gains from trade.
An attractive feature of multi-factor gravity models is that they provide a theoretical frame-
work to explore quantitatively the distributional consequences of globalization. Using Equations
(34) and (35), one could easily compute the change in the skill premium associated with interna-
tional trade. One caveat, however, is that multi-factor gravity models considered here implicitly
rule outdifferences in factor intensity across ﬁrms withinthe same sector. As discussedin Burstein
and Vogel (2010), more productive ﬁrms tend to be more skill intensive in practice, which opens
up a new channel through which trade liberalization may contribute to an increase in inequality
by leading to the exit of the least efﬁcient ﬁrms. Burstein and Vogel (2010) ﬁnd that this “skill-
biased” mechanism is quantitatively more important than the Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism. An-
other caveat is that models in this section abstract from trade in capital goods. Given the existence
ofcapital-skillcomplementarity, thisisanotherchannelthroughwhichtrademayaffectinequality.
This issue is explored quantitatively in Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2011) and Parro (2012).
23We have explored the sensitivity of our results to the assumption of Cobb-Douglas technologies for the United
States. Following Katz and Murphy (1992), we have set r = 1.4 rather than r = 1 and recomputed Gj using Equation
(32). The results are basically unchanged.
243.6 Other Extensions
Non-CES Utility. Although gravity models reviewed so far differ in terms of their supply-side
assumptions, they all share the same demand structure. Starting with the Armington model pre-
sented in Section 2, all models features representative agents with (nested) CES utility. A non-
trivial cost of this assumption is that implies constant markups across ﬁrms under monopolistic
competition. Hence, the“pro-competitive”effectsoftradeunderthismarketstructure, namelythe
idea that welfare gains from trade may be larger because of their effects on ﬁrm-level markups, are
de facto ruled out. In this ﬁnal subsection, we brieﬂy discuss recent work that has tried to incor-
porate these considerations into otherwise standard quantitative trade models with monopolistic
competition.
The three main alternatives to CES utility in trade models are: (i) separable, but non-CES
utility functions, as in the pioneering work of Krugman (1979); (ii) a quadratic, but non-separable
utility function, as in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008); and (iii) a translog expenditure function, as in
Feenstra (2003). In Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), the authors start
from a general demand system that encompasses all three alternatives.
Under the assumptions that there exists a ﬁnite reservation price for all varieties; that there
are no ﬁxed exporting costs; and that the distribution of ﬁrm-level productivity is Pareto, they
show that, in spite of variable markups, trade ﬂows satisfy the same gravity equation (16) as in
models with CES utility. In this situation, one can use the exact hat algebra to show that the macro-
level predictions of non-CES models regarding the consequences of trade liberalization—namely,
the predictions regarding the effects of changes in trade costs on wages and trade ﬂows—are the
same as in quantitative trade models with CES utility functions discussed in Section 3.1.
Although the predictions regarding trade ﬂows and wages of CES and non-CES model consid-
ered in Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) are equivalent, their welfare
predictions are not. The gains from trade liberalization, in particular, may be larger or smaller
depending on whether they trigger factor reallocations towards goods exhibiting larger or smaller
markups, respectively. In the data, the authors ﬁnd slightly smaller gains from trade liberalization
using models with variable markups.
A potentially fruitful alternative to studying the pro-competitive effects of trade consists in
departing from monopolistic competition, while maintaining CES. As already discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1, the model with Bertrand competition developed by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum
(2003) leads to the exact same predictions as one-sector gravity models with perfect and monopo-
listic competition, though alternative assumptions about the distribution of ﬁrm-level productiv-
ity may lead to different results; see de Blas and Russ (2010) and Holmes, Hsu, and Lee (2010).
In recent work, Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2011) have used the model with Cournot competi-
tion developed by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) to study the magnitude of the gains from trade
in economies with variable markups. When calibrating this model using data on manufacturing
Taiwanese ﬁrms, they ﬁnd large gains from trade, though the numbers vary depending on as-
sumptions made on the correlation of productivity between Taiwanese and non-Taiwanese ﬁrms.
25Multinational Production. In all the models reviewed so far, ﬁrms serve foreign markets exclu-
sively through exports. In practice, however, a large share of foreign sales are done by foreign
afﬁliates of multinational ﬁrms.
Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) extend the perfectly competitive framework of Eaton
and Kortum (2002) so that the technological know-how from a given country can be used to pro-
duce elsewhere, albeit perhaps at a cost. The cost of using local technologies abroad limits the
extent of multinational production in the same way as iceberg trade costs limits the extent of in-
ternational trade in gravity models. They explore how the substitutability and complementarity
forces between trade and multinational production affect the magnitude of the gains from trade
and the gains from openness more broadly deﬁned. Their calibrated model implies that the gains
from trade can be twice as high as the gains calculated in trade-only models.24
Arkolakis, Ramondo, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yeaple (2012) extend the monopolistically compet-
itive framework of Melitz (2003) to allow ﬁrms to serve foreign markets by exporting from their
home country or by setting up foreign afﬁliates. In this environment, a gravity equation akin to
Equation (5) still holds for the sales by ﬁrms from a particular origin, i.e., for the sales in coun-
try j of goods produced in country i by afﬁliates of ﬁrms from country l. Given data on bilateral
trade and multinational production ﬂows (i.e., the value of production by ﬁrms from i in country
l, independently of where the goods are sold), they show how their model can be used to conduct
counterfactual experiments using the exact hat algebra of Section 2.2.
4 Evaluating Trade Policy
In this section we go from changes in iceberg trade costs to changes in trade policy, namely import
tariffs. For expositional purposes, we ﬁrst go back to the simple Armington model presented in
Section 2 and describe the welfare implications of tariff changes in that environment. Like in Sec-
tion 3, we then study how these predictions vary across different gravity models. We conclude by
discussing issues of aggregation in the presence of heterogeneous tariffs across sectors. Through-
out this section we modify our WIOD data such that, in line with the static models that we study,
overall trade is balanced country-by-country; see online Appendix for details. We tackle the issue
of trade imbalances explicitly in Section 5.1.
4.1 Back to Armington
Consider a world economy similar to the one presented in Section 2.1. Compared to our earlier
analysis, trade ﬂows may now be subject to import tariffs so that Equation (3) generalizes to
Pij = Yitij
￿
1+ tij
￿
/Qi, (36)
24In related work, Ramondo (2012) adapts the framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to environments with multi-
national production but no trade. She derives a gravity equation for multinational production ﬂows and computes the
associated gains. Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009), Prescott and McGrattan (2010), and Garetto (2012) also quantify
the gains from multinational production, albeit in models without a gravity equation for multinational production.
26where Yi denotes factor income in country i, i.e. GDP net of tariff revenues, and tij ￿ 0 denotes the
ad-valorem tariff imposed by country j on goods from country i. In the rest of this section, we let
fij ￿ tij
￿
1+ tij
￿
denote the total trade costs between country i and j. Given CES utility, the value
of bilateral trade ﬂows (inclusive of tariffs) are thus given by the following gravity equation:
Xij =
￿
Yifij
￿￿#
cij
å
n
l=1
￿
Ylflj
￿￿#
clj
Ej. (37)
Inthepresenceofimporttariffs, budgetbalancenowrequires Ej = Yj+Tj, where Tj ￿ å
n
i=1
tij
1+tijXij
denotes total tariff revenues in country j, whereas the good market clearing condition requires
Yi = å
n
j=1
1
1+tijXij. Together with Equation (37), these two conditions lead to the following gener-
alization of Equation (6):
Yi = å
n
j=1
1
1+ tij
￿
Yifij
￿￿#
cij
å
n
l=1
￿
Ylflj
￿￿#
clj
Yj
1￿ pj
, (38)
where pj ￿ å
n
i=1
tij
1+tij
(Yifij)
￿#
cij
å
n
l=1(Ylflj)
￿#
clj
2 (0,1) denotes the share of tariff revenues in country j’s total
expenditure. This completes the description of a competitive equilibrium with import tariffs.
Now consider an arbitrary change in import tariffs from t￿
￿
tij
￿
to t0￿
n
t0
ij
o
. To compute
proportional changes in factor income, ˆ Y￿
￿ ˆ Yi
￿
, we can again use the exact hat algebra. Following
the same steps as in Section 2.2, we get
ˆ YjYj = å
n
i=1
1
1+ t0
ij
lji
￿
ˆ Yjˆ fji
￿￿#
å
n
l=1 lli
￿ ˆ Yl ˆ fli
￿￿#
ˆ YiYi
1￿ p0
i
, (39)
where the share of tariff revenues in the counterfactual equilibrium is itself given by
p0
i = å
n
j=1
t0
ji
1+ t0
ji
lji
￿
ˆ Yjˆ fji
￿￿#
å
n
l=1 lli
￿ ˆ Yl ˆ fli
￿￿#. (40)
Combining the two previous expressions we can solve for ˆ Y￿
￿ ˆ Yi
￿
(up to a normalization). Al-
though the previous system of equations is not quite as compact as Equation(11), it still does not
depend directly on preference shifters, endowments, or trade costs. All we need to determine
changes in factor income levels, ˆ Yi, are the initial expenditure shares, lij, the initial factor income
levels, Yi, and the trade elasticity, #. Like in Section 2.2, once changes in tariff income are known,
27we can compute changes in expenditure shares using the gravity equation (37),
ˆ lij =
￿
ˆ Yi ˆ fij
￿￿#
å
n
l=1 llj
￿
ˆ Yl ˆ flj
￿￿#.
Finally, to compute the welfare change caused by the change in import tariff, we can start from
Equation (9). Integrating and taking into account the fact that Ej = Yj/
￿
1￿ pj
￿
, we obtain
ˆ Cj =
 
1￿ pj
1￿ p0
j
!
ˆ l
￿1/#
jj . (41)
where the share of tariff revenues in the initial and counterfactual equilibria are given by pj =
å
n
i=1
tij
1+tijlij and p0
j = å
n
i=1
t0
ij
1+t0
ij
lij ˆ lij, respectively.25 Like in Section 2.2, welfare changes can
be computed using only a few sufﬁcient statistics. One does not need to estimate all structural
parameters of the model to estimate the welfare effect of an arbitrary tariff change.
We start by considering the welfare effects of a change in tariffs imposed by a single country,
i.e., a unilateral change in tariffs. For simplicity, we assume that import tariffs are equal to zero
in the initial equilibrium, tij = 0 for all i and j. This is not a bad approximation for most OECD
countriestoday, wheretariffrevenuesareanegligibleshareofGDP.26 Weconsideracounterfactual
equilibriuminwhichasinglecountry j imposesauniformtariffonallitstradingpartners, i.e. t0
ij =
t > 0 for all i 6= j. All other structural parameters are held ﬁxed between the initial equilibrium
and the counterfactual equilibrium.
In Figure 1, we plot the welfare change associated with a unilateral tariff of t% for j =United
States, France, Portugal, and Ireland under the assumption that the trade elasticity # is equal to 5.
For each counterfactual exercise, we ﬁrst compute proportional income changes using Equation
(39) and (40) and then, for each country j, welfare changes using Equation (41).
A few features of Figure 1 stand out. First, we see that for all countries, the optimal tariff is
around 20%. This should not be surprising. In the two-country case, we know from the work of
Gros (1987)—see also Helpman and Krugman (1989), Chapter 7—that the optimal tariff in coun-
try j is equal to t￿
j = 1/
￿
#l￿
jj
￿
, where l￿
jj denotes the share of expenditure in the rest of the world
on goods produced in the rest of the world. For all countries, one should expect l￿
jj to be very
close to one in practice. So 1/# = 20% provides a good approximation of what the optimal tariff
should be. Second, we see that the potential gains from trade protection are modest, but non-
25Equation (41) implies that, with tariffs, the gains from trade are given by Gj = 1 ￿
￿
1￿ pj
￿
l1/#
jj . This gener-
alizes Equation (12) to environments in which the share of tariff revenues in total expenditure, pj, is non-zero. See
Felbermayr, Jung, and Larch (2013) for a discussion of the role of tariff revenues on the gains from trade.
26For example, in 2005 revenues as a share of GDP were 0.25%, 0.20%, and 0.36% for Canada, the United States
and Mexico, respectively (stats.oecd.org: Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation – Taxation, under Revenue
Statistics, Customs and Import Duties over GDP). Developed countries in general have tariff revenue shares of 0.2%
or less. Tariff revenues are more important for developing countries. For example, they were 1.8% of GDP in India in
2004. Other prominent examples of high tariff revenues are Russia (3.16%) and China (0.84%), both in the year 2000 –
before they joined the WTO (Government Finance Statistics, IMF).
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Figure 1: Welfare changes associated with a unilateral tariff in the country imposing the tariff.
Trade elasticity # = 5. Data are from WIOD in 2008.
trivial. At the optimal tariff, they range from 0.3% for the United States to 1.3% for Ireland. To put
these numbers in perspective, note that the overall gains from trade predicted by the Armington
model for these two countries are 1.8% and 8%, respectively; see Table 1 Column 1. Third, smaller
countries that gain more from trade also gain more from optimal trade protection. Here, although
smaller countries have less ability to manipulate their terms-of-trade, they beneﬁt disproportion-
ately more from an improvement in their terms-of-trade.27 Finally, we see that the range over
which trade protection is welfare-improving is large. For all four countries, import tariffs up to
50% are found to increase real consumption relative to free trade.
Up to this point, we have only focused on welfare changes in the country imposing the import
tariff. We now turn to the effects on the rest of the world. We restrict ourselves to a counterfactual
scenario in which the United States unilaterally imposes an import tariff of 40% on all its trading
partners, t0
iUS = 0.4 for all i 6=United States. This is close to the tariff level observed in the United
States in the late 19th and early 20th century; see e.g. Irwin (1998). The welfare changes caused
by the 40% tariff in each trading partner of the United States are reported in Column 1 of Table 2.
The striking feature of these numbers is that in spite of the fact that the United States is the largest
country in the world (in terms of GDP) and that 40% is a large tariff by historical standards, the
impact on the rest of the world is small. On average, real consumption goes down by 0.2%. The
only two exceptions are Canada and Mexico, which incur loses of 1.2% and 1.1%, respectively.
The previous counterfactual exercise may mask the true cost of trade protection if other coun-
27In general, one would expect gains from trade protection to have an inverted-U shape as a function of country size,
since gains from applying an optimal tariff must go to zero as countries become either inﬁnitesimally small or inﬁnitely
large. Figure 1 suggests that countries in our dataset are sufﬁciently large that they are on the declining segment of this
curve.
29tries retaliate by increasing their own import tariffs. A very crude way to assess the quantitative
importance of trade wars is to consider a counterfactual scenario in which all countries, rather
than one, impose a 40% import tariff on all their trading partners. The associated welfare changes
are reported in Column 5 of Table 2. On average, countries experience losses of 2.3%. The biggest
loser is Ireland (￿4.4%) while the country that loses the least is the United States (￿0.8%). In this
particular counterfactual scenario, no country wins the trade war, though the largest country in
the world is the one that loses the least.
Whilethepreviousnumbersareillustrative, amoresatisfactorywaytostudytheconsequences
of trade wars is to solve for the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative tariff game. As demon-
strated in Ossa (2011b), one can still do so using the exact hat algebra. The only difference between
this analysis and the one presented in this section is that proportional changes in trade costs, ˆ fij,
are no longer exogenously given, but correspond to the best-response of each country to the vector
of import tariffs chosen by its trading partner. Using a multi-sector gravity model with monopo-
listic competition and estimates of trade elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006), Ossa (2011b)
ﬁnds Nash tariffs around 60% around the world. Ossa ﬁnds that the associated welfare loss asso-
ciated with going from the current, observed equilibrium to the counterfactual Nash equilibrium
is equal to 3.5% on average.
4.2 Alternative Gravity Models Revisited
In the previous subsection we have focused on the predictions of a simple Armington model. We
now go back the main gravity models considered in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 to see how multiple
sectors, intermediate goods, and monopolistic competition affect these predictions. For exposi-
tional purposes, we restrict ourselves to counterfactual scenarios in which tariffs are common
across sectors. We discuss the speciﬁc issues associated with heterogeneity in tariffs in the next
subsection.
We start by allowing for multiple sectors and intermediate goods, in the exact same way as in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, while retaining the assumption of perfect competition, ds = 0 for all s. As in
Section 4.1, we assume that all tariffs are zero in the initial equilibrium. Columns 2 and 4 in Table
2 report the welfare effects of a unilateral 40% tariff imposed by the United States on all its trading
partner in all sectors. Column 2 corresponds to the predictions of the multi-sector model without
intermediate goods, aj,s = 0, whereas Column 4 corresponds to the predictions with intermediate
goods, aj,s > 0.28 Columns 6 and 7 show the analogous results when the 40% tariff is imposed
uniformly by all countries around the world. For both counterfactual scenarios, welfare changes
are computed using the exact-hat algebra as we did in the case of the simple Armington model.
Moving from a one-sector to a multi-sector model has ambiguous effects on the welfare losses
from a tariff; for many countries we actually see smaller losses. For example, the welfare losses in
China from the 40% worldwide tariff fall from 1.6% in the one-sector model (Column 5) to 0.4% in
28In the latter case, shares of intermediate goods are computed as a￿
j,ks =
￿
åk åi Xij,ks/Rj,s
￿
￿
￿
Ej,k/Ej
￿
.
30the multi-sector model (Column 6). On average, welfare losses go from 2.3% (Column 5) to 1.4%
(Column 6). Although we know from the results of Section 3.3 that a prohibitive tariff should lead
to higher welfare losses when there are multiple-sectors, we see that even for tariffs as high as 40%
worldwide, this is not the case. Thus one should be careful when extrapolating from the autarky
exercises of Section 3 to richer comparative static exercises. Models that point towards larger gains
from trade liberalization for one counterfactual scenario may very well lead to smaller gains from
trade liberalization for another.
In contrast, allowing for intermediate goods signiﬁcantly ampliﬁes the losses generated by
tariffs for all countries, echoing the results of Section 3.4. Canada now experiences a welfare loss
of 2.3% (Column 4) rather than 1.2% (Column 2) as a consequence of the 40% tariff imposed by
the United States, while average losses are now 0.33% (Column 4) rather than 0.14% (Column 2).
A worldwide tariff of 40% now leads to losses in Belgium of 6.3% (Column 7) rather than 2.6%
(Column 6). On average, allowing for intermediate goods leads to welfare losses of 3.4% (Column
7) rather than 1.4% (Column 6).
We next study how market structure affects the welfare effects of a worldwide tariffs of 40%.
As explained in Section 3, moving from perfect to monopolistic competition introduces scale ef-
fects, which complicates the computation of counterfactual equilibria with tariffs. To ease the
computational burden, we use a coarser version of our dataset in all the exercises that follow.
Speciﬁcally, we aggregate the set of countries in the WIOD into 10 regions and 16 sectors: 15 agri-
culture and manufacturing sectors plus 1 service sector; see online Appendix for details. Using
this coarser dataset, we compare the predictions of gravity models under the assumption of: (i)
perfect competition; (ii) monopolistic competition without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, as in Krug-
man (1980); and (iii) monopolistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, as in Melitz (2003).29
In the case of models with monopolistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, counterfactual
predictions depend on whether ﬁxed exporting costs are paid in the importing country or export-
ing country and whether import tariffs are imposed before or after ﬁrm-level markups. In what
follows we assume that ﬁxed exporting costs are paid in the exporting country, cx
ij = Yi, and that
tariffs are imposed before markups; see online Appendix for details.30
Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3 present results for the model without intermediates, as in Section 3.3,
while Columns 4 to 6 present results for the model with intermediates, as in Section 3.4. Under
perfect competition without intermediate goods (Column 1 in Table 3), the welfare losses associ-
ated with a 40% worldwide tariff are lower than before (Column 6 in Table 2). This reﬂects the
fact that, by construction, tariffs are now forced to be zero within regions. Column 2 of Table
29We maintain the assumption that the service sector is perfectly competitive. Formally, in cases (ii) and (iii) we set
and ds = 1 for all s 6= 16 and d16 = 0. The only difference is that in case (ii) we set hs = 0 for all s whereas in case (iii)
we set hs = 0.65 for all s.
30When tariffs are imposed before markups, they act as “cost-shifters.” Under this assumption, the elasticity of bilat-
eral trade ﬂows with respect to tariffs and iceberg trade costs coincide. When tariffs are imposed after markups, they
act as “demand-shifters.” Under this assumption, the elasticity with respect to tariffs is equal to # + h rather than #; see
online Appendix and Felbermayr, Jung, and Larch (2013). Since there is little empirical evidence to help us discriminate
between these two cases, we prefer working under the assumption that there is only one elasticity.
313 shows the analogous results under monopolistic competition without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.
As in Section 3.3, the differences between perfect and monopolistic competition arise because of
sector-level scale effects triggered by trade protection. Welfare losses tend to be larger under mo-
nopolistic competition than perfect competition, although there are some exceptions, including
North America for which losses go from 0.6% to 0.4%. Finally, Column 3 of Table 3 shows the re-
sults under monopolistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. We see that all regions have
slightly lower welfare losses than in the absence of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. One potential expla-
nation is that the introduction of tariffs leads to an increase in the ratio of expenditures—which
include tariff revenues—to factor prices. This tends to increase the set of varieties available to
consumers when a tariff is imposed in models with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity through selection ef-
fects. Since consumers love variety, this tends to reduce the welfare losses associated with a tariff
in such models.
How are the previous results affected by the introduction of intermediate goods? We again
ﬁnd that welfare losses from tariffs tend to be larger in models with monopolistic competition.
Moving from Column 4 to Column 5 in Table 3, the losses from the tariff for Western Europe and
Latin America increase from 1.6% to 7.6% and from 1.5% to 3.1%, respectively. Welfare losses tend
to be even larger under ﬁrm-level heterogeneity (Column 6 in Table 3). The average welfare losses
increase from 5.3% to 7.0%. Like in Section 3.4, this reﬂects stronger scale effects under models of
monopolistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.
In recent work Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) have compared the predictions of
a multi-sector Armington model with intermediate goods to those of a multi-sector Melitz (2003)
model with intermediate goods. To compare the two models, they ﬁrst estimate the structural
parameters of the Melitz (2003) model using non-linear least squares and investigate the welfare
consequences of a 50% reduction in observed tariffs. They then ask what the welfare consequences
of the same tariff change would have been in an Armington model calibrated using the same
elasticity of substitution between goods (but different trade elasticities) and the same variable
trade costs. They ﬁnd gains from 50% reduction in tariffs that are four times larger according
to the Melitz (2003) model and conclude that it is important to add ﬁrm-level heterogeneity to
standard quantitative trade models.
The similarity between the quantitative results of Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011)
and those presented in Table 3 notwithstanding, there are some important methodological differ-
ences. In order to demonstrate the importance of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, Balistreri, Hillberry,
and Rutherford (2011) compare Armington to Melitz (2003). Here we compare Krugman (1980) to
Melitz (2003). To us the latter comparison is preferable to the former since comparing Armington
and Melitz (2003) makes it impossible to separate the role of monopolistic competition from the
role of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. The results of Table 3 illustrate the importance of this distinction
both qualitatively and quantitatively. When comparing Columns 1 and 3, one would conclude
that gains from trade liberalization are larger in models with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Yet com-
paring Columns 2 and 3, we see that the average welfare loss would be even higher in the absence
32of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. Similarly, when comparing Columns 4 and 6, one would conclude
that average welfare losses are almost three times as large. Yet the relevant comparison, Column
5 to Column 6, suggests less dramatic differences, with average welfare losses going from 5.3% to
7.0%.
The more substantial methodological difference comes from how we calibrate the models
whose predictions we want to compare. In Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011), differ-
ent models do not match the same set of moments, including the trade elasticity. In this chapter,
they do. Our view is that whether or not one wants to “recalibrate” models depends on why one
is interested in comparing the predictions of different models in the ﬁrst place.
The thought experiment that motivates us can be sketched as follows. Consider two trade
economists trying to predict the welfare effects of the same tariff change. Both economists have
access to the same trade data in 2008, but the ﬁrst-one has been trained in the 1980s and thinks
that Krugman (1980) is a useful approximation of the world economy, whereas the second has
been trained in the 2000s and thinks that Melitz (2003) is. We want to know whether conditional on
the same trade data, the forecasts of the ﬁrst and second economists would differ. When comparing
one model to another, we therefore recalibrate all structural parameters so that each models ﬁts
the same cross-section of bilateral trade ﬂows and trade elasticity.
The thought experiment behind the results of Balistreri, Hillberry, and Rutherford (2011) is
implicitly different. The idea is to start with one economist, trained in the 2000s, ask for her fore-
cast of the effects of trade policy in 2008 and then ask whether she would have made a different
forecast in a counterfactual world without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. This is why Balistreri, Hillberry,
and Rutherford (2011) ﬁrst structurally estimate a Melitz (2003) model and then “turn off” hetero-
geneity across ﬁrms (among other things).
So which of these two thought experiments is more useful? If the question is how the Melitz
(2003)modelhaschangedtheevaluationoftradepolicy, wethinkthattheﬁrstthoughtexperiment
is the appropriate one and that comparing Column 2 to Column 3 or Column 5 to Column 6
in Table 3 is the right way to go. In contrast, if one is interested in decomposing the results of
Columns 3 or 6 so that one can quantify the role of heterogeneity for welfare within the Melitz
(2003) model, then the second thought experiment is more useful.
4.3 Heterogeneous Tariffs
In practice, tariffs are not uniform across sectors within the same country. This raises a number of
questions: Does heterogeneity in tariffs raise the cost of trade protection in the country imposing
the tariffs? If so, is this also true in the countries facing the tariffs? In theory, what is the “right”
way to measure the restrictiveness of trade policy when trade policy is a multi-dimensional object?
Let us start by focusing on the ﬁrst two questions. We use the simplest model in which these
questions can be addressed: a multi-sector gravity model without intermediate goods and with
perfect competition. Thus the assumptions are the same as in Section 3.3 with ds = 0 for all s. We
again consider the counterfactual scenario in which only one country, the United States, imposes
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Figure 2: Welfare changes in the United States associated with a unilateral U.S. tariff with and
without dispersion across sectors. D = 0.4 in the case with dispersion. Sector-level trade elastici-
ties are from Caliendo and Parro (2010). Data are from WIOD in 2008.
the same tariffs, t0
iUS,s = ts, on all its trading partners. But we now allow tariffs to vary across
sectors s. Namely, we assume that ts = t + Ds, where Ds 2 f￿a,ag is randomly drawn across
sectors. Draws of a and ￿a have equal probabilities so that the expected value of the tariff is t
in each sector. In the simulations below we draw the vector D ￿ (D1,D2,...,DS) 1,000 times and
report the average results for ˆ Cj across all these draws.
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 we report the welfare change associated with a counterfactual
scenario in which t = 0.4 and a = 0 and a = 0.2, respectively. Thus, the expected tariff is 40% in
both cases, but there is dispersion in the U.S. tariff across sectors in Column 3 and no dispersion
in Column 2. Speciﬁcally, in Column 3, some sectors face a 20% import tariffs, whereas others face
a 60% tariff. Comparing Columns 2 and 3 we see that introducing dispersion leads to a decline
in the welfare gain from imposing tariffs in the United States from 0.4% to 0.3%. Although there
is no systematic relationship between tariff dispersion and welfare, as discussed in Anderson and
Neary (2005), these two numbers resonate well with a simple partial equilibrium intuition. If the
welfare distortions associated with a tariff are given by the “triangle” below the import demand
curve, then holding the average import tariff ﬁxed, an increase in dispersion should tend to lower
welfare, which is what happens in this example. By comparing Columns 2 and 3 in Table 2, we
also see that other countries are actually better off when the there is dispersion in the US tariff. For
example, Canada’s welfare loss from the U.S. tariff falls from 1.2% to 1%, while Mexico’s losses
fall from 0.9% to 0.7%. Intuitively, expenditure functions are concave in prices. So if dispersion in
U.S. tariffs also increases dispersion in the price of U.S. goods abroad, this should tend to reduce
expenditure and, in turn, increase welfare abroad.
To conclude, let us go back to the issue of how to measure the restrictiveness of trade pol-
34icy when trade policy is a multi-dimensional object. Anderson and Neary (2005) propose the
following two-step approach. First, ask: What is the welfare loss associated with a vector of het-
erogeneous tariffs in the country imposing those tariffs? Second, compute the uniform tariff across
sectors that would lead to the same welfare loss. This number is what Anderson and Neary (2005)
refer to as the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI). One way to compute this index is to estimate im-
port demand elasticities and use linear approximations; see e.g. Feenstra (1995) and Kee, Nicita,
and Olarreaga (2008). An alternative is to use the full structure of the model. We now do so again
for the case above with t = 0.4 and a = 0.2. From Table 2 Column 2, we know that the welfare
change in the United States is 0.27%. The Trade Restrictiveness Index can then be read off Figure
2, which is the counterpart of Figure 1 in the multi-sector case. In this particular example, there
are two values of the TRI: 8.5% and 69%. The non-uniqueness of the TRI reﬂects the importance
of general equilibrium effects in gravity models.
5 Numbers We Can Believe In?
5.1 Sensitivity to Auxiliary Assumptions
In Sections 3 and 4 we have studied how different assumptions about technology and market
structure may affect the welfare consequences of trade liberalization. This exercise already gives
us a sense of the sensitivity of the counterfactual predictions of gravity models to a set of key
economic assumptions. Here we go one step further by exploring how apparently innocuous
auxiliary assumptions may also have large implications for counterfactual analysis.
Nature of Trade Imbalances. All models reviewed in this chapter are static models that aim
to capture the long-run consequences of trade liberalization. Given their static nature, all these
models predict that trade should be balanced country-by-country. In practice, it is not. Volumes
of intertemporal trade are substantial: some countries, like the United States, run large current-
account deﬁcits, whereas others, like China, run large current-account surpluses. To deal with
trade imbalances in the context of a static model, the standard approach consists in modelling
trade deﬁcits and surpluses as lump-sum transfers between countries; see e.g. Dekle, Eaton, and
Kortum (2008). Short of a dynamic theory of trade imbalances, in which today’s trade deﬁcits are
paid back by future trade surpluses, the researcher interested in the effects of a change in trade
policy has to assume that these lump-sum transfers remain “unchanged” between the initial and
the counterfactual equilibrium.
An obvious question when adopting the previous approach is: “unchanged” compared to
what? When thinking about the U.S. deﬁcit, for instance, should one hold its value ﬁxed relative
to U.S. GDP or World GDP to mention only two of the most natural alternatives? To get a sense of
the importance of these considerations, let us go back to the Armington model with import tariffs
considered in Section 4.1. In the presence of trade imbalances across countries, the equilibrium
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Figure 3: Welfare changes associated with a 40% tariff around the world when deﬁcits are pro-
portional to World GDP (x-axis) and domestic GDP (y-axis). Trade elasticity # = 5. Data are from
WIOD in 2008.
condition (38) generalizes to
Yi = å
n
j=1
1
1+ tij
￿
Yifij
￿￿#
cij
å
n
l=1
￿
Ylflj
￿￿#
clj
Yj + Dj
1￿ pj
, (42)
where Dj ￿ Ej ￿
￿
Yj + Tj
￿
denotes the trade deﬁcit in country j. The two assumptions mentioned
above about the nature of trade imbalances correspond to Dj = {jYj and Dj = {j å
n
i=1 Yi, respec-
tively, where {j is treated as an exogenous structural parameter that determines the magnitude of
lump-sum transfers across countries.
Starting from Equation (42) and some assumption about how trade deﬁcits relate to factor
incomes, either Dj = {jYj or Dj = {j å
n
i=1 Yi, one can conduct counterfactual analysis using the
exact hat algebra, as we did in Section 4.1. In Figure 3, we plot the welfare changes associated
with 40% import tariffs imposed around the world under the assumption that Dj = {jYj (x-axis)
and Dj = {j å
n
i=1 Yi (y-axis). The correlation between the two measures is equal to 0.86. Not sur-
prisingly, the biggest discrepancies between the two numbers come from countries running large
trade deﬁcits, like Greece or Romania, or large trade surpluses, like Ireland and the Netherlands.31
It is worth pointing out, however, that both sets of results differ from the numbers presented
in Section 4.1 in which we had removed trade imbalances before analyzing the consequences of
31While this example illustrates the potential sensitivity of quantitative predictions to ad-hoc assumptions about
the nature of trade imbalances, it should be clear that the importance of these considerations depends, in general,
on the variable of interest, the underlying model, and the nature of the counterfactual exercise. For instance, when
the counterfactual exercise consists in moving to autarky under perfect competition, changes in real factor income are
unaffected by the size and nature of transfers across countries.
36a worldwide tariff. The correlation between either one of the two measures presented here and
the results of Section 4.1 is 0.57. This discrepancy is caused by larger terms-of-trade improve-
ments for countries that maintain large trade deﬁcits. Intuitively, as tariffs increase, consumers
have incentives to substitute away from foreign goods towards domestic goods. Thus, in order
to maintain trade deﬁcits “unchanged” in the counterfactual equilibrium, domestic prices must
increase relative to the price of foreign goods.
Nature of Physical Capital. In earlier sections we have implicitly treated physical capital as a
primary factor of production whose endowment is ﬁxed and unaffected by trade. Alternatively,
one could think of physical capital as capital goods that, like other intermediate goods, are traded
internationally; seee.g. EatonandKortum(2001). Togetasenseofhowimportantthisassumption
on the nature of physical capital could be, we come back to the model of Section 3.4 with multiple
sectors, tradableintermediategoods, andperfectcompetition. ComparedtotheanalysisofSection
3.4, the only difference is that we adjust value-added shares in the data so that the (presumed) one
third share of capital in value added is distributed proportionally among intermediate goods from
all industries. Formally, we adjust shares by setting a0
i,ks = ai,ks
￿
1+ 1
3
1￿ai,s
ai,s
￿
. By construction, the
newvalueaddedshareisthereforetwothirdsoftheonereportedinthedata: 1￿a0
i,s = 2
3 (1￿ ai,s).
When physical capital is treated as another tradable intermediate goods, the ampliﬁcation effect
fromtheinput-outputloopdiscussed inSection3.4isnowstronger, andthegainsarelarger. Using
again WIOD data from 2008, we ﬁnd that average gains from trade are equal to 34.6% compared
to 26.9% when physical capital is assumed to be immobile across countries. For example, gains
from trade in Canada are now 36.9% rather than 30.2%, and in the United States they are 11.3%
rather than 8.3%.
5.2 Goodness of Fit
One way to try to build conﬁdence in the predictions of gravity models is to assess whether they
can match cross-sectional or time-series evidence on bilateral trade ﬂows.
Cross-sectional Evidence. A standard practice in the literature consists in assuming ﬁrst that ice-
berg trade costs t are deterministic functions of various observables such as physical distance
between country i and country j, whether country i and j share a common border or language,
or whether they are part of a regional trade agreement or a monetary union. Once trade cost
functions—together with other structural parameters of the model—have been estimated or cali-
brated, one can assess the goodness of ﬁt of the gravity model by comparing trade ﬂows predicted
by the model to those that are observed in the data; see e.g. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009),
Waugh (2010), and Fieler (2011).
The empirical ﬁt of gravity models tends to be very good; see Anderson (2010). It is not clear,
however, whether this should make us very conﬁdent in the counterfactual predictions of these
models. If iceberg trade costs t are used as free parameters, then gravity models can replicate
any cross-section of bilateral trade ﬂows, X. Thus, one way to interpret the good ﬁt of the gravity
37models under particular restrictions on the structure of iceberg trade costs is that these restricted
trade costs are good proxies of the “wedges” that are necessary for the model to match the data.
An alternative strategy, in the spirit of the test of Heckscher-Ohlin-Theorem in Treﬂer (1993), is
to infer from the trade data the iceberg trade costs such that gravity models ﬁt perfectly and then
check whether the inferred iceberg trade costs match observable measures of trade costs such as
tariffs and freight costs or price gaps (which should reﬂect trade costs under perfect competition).
Anissuewiththisapproachisthatonecannotseparatelyidentifyicebergtradecostsfromcountry-
speciﬁc biases in preferences in the model. If “wedges” only match observed measures of trade
costs very imperfectly, should we conclude that there is a problem with the model or that biases
in preferences are important?
In recent work, Anderson and Yotov (2012) propose to test gravity models by focusing on
the restrictions that it imposes on the relationship between exporter- and importer-ﬁxed effects
in equation (13), whatever the structure of iceberg trade costs may be. Another possible strategy
to assess the goodness of ﬁt of quantitative trade models consists in using other, i.e. non-trade,
data sources. For instance, since gravity models offer a mapping between trade data and con-
sumer price indices, one could compare the prices predicted by the model to those observed in
the data. Waugh (2010) and Fitzgerald (forthcoming) offer two examples of papers exploring the
implications of gravity models for prices.
Time Series Evidence. Perhaps the most direct way to test the predictions of a gravity model is to
calibrate the model in a baseline year t, consider a change in trade costs between the baseline year
t and some other year t0, and report the “distance” between the predictions of the model and the
data at date t0.
A natural candidate for large changes in trade costs are regional trade agreements like the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Caliendo and Parro (2010) use a multi-sector
version of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with intermediate goods calibrated to match trade data from
1993tostudytheeffectsofNAFTA.ThismodelisaspecialcaseofthemodelsconsideredinSection
3.4 in that it does not feature any scale effects: ds = 0 for all s. After feeding tariff changes caused
by NAFTA between 1993 and 2005, they ﬁnd that the simulated changes can account for 93% of
the observed change in Mexico’s total trade over GDP, 58% for Canada, and 55% for the United
States.
The relatively good ﬁt of their model contrasts with the fairly poor performance of earlier CGE
models reviewed in Kehoe (2005). He evaluates the performances of three of the most promi-
nent multisectoral applied general equilibrium models used to predict the impact of NAFTA:
the Brown-Deardorff-Stern model of all three North American economies (Brown, Deardorff, and
Stern (1992)), the Cox-Harris model of Canada (Cox and Harris (1992)) and the Sobarzo model of
Mexico (Sobarzo (1992)). He ﬁnds that each of these models drastically underestimated the impact
of NAFTA on trade volumes. For instance, the Brown-Deardorff-Stern model predicts changes in
exports relative to GDP between 1988 and 1999 equal to 50.8% for Mexico, 4.3% for Canada, and
2.9% for the United States. In the data, these changes are equal 140.6%, 52.9%, and 19.1%, respec-
38tively.
It is not entirely clear, however, what accounts for the difference in the performance between
more recent and older CGE models. Caliendo and Parro (2010) emphasize the importance of
input-output linkages for their results, but such linkages are already present in older CGE mod-
els. One economically meaningful difference is that the previous CGE models feature imperfect
competition and scale effects, whereas Caliendo and Parro (2010) does not. But there are many
other potential sources of discrepancies, from the calibration of the trade elasticities (more on that
below) to the choice of the baseline year. Indeed, although the predictions of the models reviewed
in Kehoe (2005) are compared with changes in the data over the period 1988-1999, the Brown-
Deardorff model was calibrated to a 1976 input-output matrix for Canada, a 1980 input-output
matrix for Mexico, and a 1977 input-output matrix for the United States. The good ﬁt of gravity
models in the time-series is also called into question by the results of Lai and Treﬂer (2002) who
ﬁnd that changes in tariffs between 1972 and 1992 fed into a simple model à la Krugman (1980)
can explain little of the variation in bilateral trade ﬂows over this time period.
A poor ﬁt of a quantitative trade model may always reﬂect the fact that the trade shock under
study is small compared to other unobserved shocks—e.g. technology, factor endowments—that
may have been occurring over the same time period. This generates a tension. One would want to
focus on shorter time periods around a particular episode of trade liberalization to exclude other
shocks, but quantitative trade models are static models that are better equipped to capture the
long-run consequences of trade liberalization than short-term dynamics. In the case of NAFTA,
for instance, would quantitative trade models perform better when the ﬁnal year is 1995, 2000, or
2005?
Donaldson (2008) offers an innovative way to test the predictions of gravity models. He fo-
cuses on one of history’s great transportation projects: the network of railroads built in colonial
India from 1870 to 1930. He ﬁrst estimates the impact of the railroad on trade costs using infor-
mation about price gaps across Indian districts. He then feeds the observed changes in trade costs
into a multi-sector version of Eaton and Kortum (2002)—a special case of the models considered
in Section 3.3 without scale effects: ds = 0 for all s—to predict the changes in real income across
Indian districts. The test of the model comes from comparing changes in real income predicted
by the model to the reduced-form estimates of changes in real income caused by the railroad. He
ﬁnds that 86% of the total impact of the railroads on real income in an average district can be
explained by the model.
5.3 Calibrating Elasticities
The key parameters for counterfactual analysis using gravity models, like other CGE models, are
elasticities. We conclude this section by discussing some of the issues arising when calibrating
elasticities.
Trade Elasticities. As can already be seen from the counterfactual analysis carried in the context
of the Armington model in Section 2, the single most important structural parameter in gravity
39models is the trade elasticity. Conditional on observed trade shares, it determines both the re-
sponse of bilateral trade ﬂows and real consumption. In more general environments such as those
considered in Section 3, it remains one of the key statistics required to estimate the gains from
international trade; see Equations (23), (27), and (32). So, how large are trade elasticities?
Thisquestionisanoldone. Itisasimportantforrecentgravitymodelsreviewedinthischapter
as for earlier CGE models. The broad consensus in the CGE literature is, in the words of Dawkins,
Srinivasan, and Whalley (2001), that “the quantity and quality of literature-based elasticity para-
meters for use in calibrated models is another Achilles’ heel of calibration.” As John Whalley notes
“It is quite extraordinary how little we know about numerical values of elasticities [...] In the in-
ternational trade area researchers commonly use import price elasticities in the neighborhood of
unity, even for small economies, even though elasticity estimates as high as nine appear in the
literature.” The same pessimism can be found in the review of trade elasticities by McDaniel and
Balistreri (2003): “The estimates from the literature provide a wide range of point estimates, and
little guidance on correct estimates to apply to a given commodity in a given model for a given
regional aggregation. Most of the controversy surrounding the [trade] elasticities reduces to a
general structural inconsistency between the econometric models used to measure the response
and the simulation models used to evaluate policy.”
Part of the success of new quantitative work in international trade lies in the tight connection
between the structural estimation of the trade elasticity and the underlying economic model. In
their seminal work, Eaton and Kortum (2002) offer multiple ways to estimate structurally the trade
elasticity using a gravity equation akin to Equation (16). Their estimates range from # = 3.60 to
# = 12.86 with a preferred value of # = 8.28 when using price gaps as a measure of trade costs.
While the range is wide, it remains in the range of elasticities used in earlier CGE models; see
Hertel (1997). In recent work, Simonovska and Waugh (2011) reﬁne Eaton and Kortum (2002)’s
preferred estimation strategy to take into account the fact that price gaps are only lower-bounds
on trade costs. Simonovska and Waugh (2011) propose a simulated method of moments to correct
for the fact that trade elasticities using price gaps tend to overestimate the sensitivity of trade
ﬂows to trade costs. Their preferred estimate of # is 4.12.
The merits of a tight connection between theory and data notwithstanding, the state of affairs
remains far from ideal. An issue with simulation using earlier CGE models, such as those used
in the evaluation of NAFTA, is that they require a very large number of elasticities. Many recent
papers, following Eaton and Kortum (2002), side-step this issue by assuming that all goods enter
utility functions through a unique CES aggregator. But empirically, there is ample evidence of
signiﬁcant variation in the trade elasticity across sectors; see e.g. Feenstra (1994), Broda and We-
instein (2006), and Hummels and Hillberry (2012). If so, why should we be more conﬁdent in the
counterfactual predictions of simpler gravity models that abstract from this heterogeneity? Given
the heterogeneity in the trade elasticity across sectors, is the trade elasticity estimated from an
aggregate gravity equation like (16) the “right” trade elasticity to calibrate a one-sector model?32
32Imbs and Mejean (2011) argue that such aggregate trade elasticities suffers from heterogeneity bias and that one
40A natural way to address the previous concerns is to write down multiple-sector models, such
as those considered in Section 3.3, and incorporate formally the heterogeneity in trade elasticities
across sectors. But this raises new issues. As the number of elasticities that needs to be esti-
mated increases, the precision with which each of those elasticities is estimated tends to decrease.
Accordingly, results become much more sensitive to the presence of outliers. To take a concrete
example, the sector-level elasticities from Caliendo and Parro (2010) used in Section 3.3 are around
8 on average. But for some sectors, like automobiles, trade elasticities are not statistically different
from zero. An elasticity of zero would imply inﬁnite gains from trade.33
Upper-level Elasticities (I): Substitution Across Sectors. Going from a one-sector to a multi-
sector model raises another question: How large is the elasticity of substitution between sectors?
All papers referenced in Section 3.3 follow what Dawkins, Srinivasan, and Whalley (2001) refer
to as the “idiot’s law of elasticities”: all elasticities are equal to one until shown to be otherwise.
How important is the assumption that upper-level utility functions are Cobb-Douglas for the pre-
dictions of multi-sector quantitative trade models?
To shed light on this question, let us make the same assumptions as in Section 3.3, expect for
the fact the upper-level utility function is now given by
Cj =
￿
å
S
s=1 bj,sC
(g￿1)/g
j,s
￿g/(g￿1)
, (43)
where g > 0 denotes the upper-level elasticity of substitution between goods from different sec-
tors; bj,s ￿ 0 are exogenous preference parameters, which we normalize such that å
S
s=1 bj,s = 1
for all j; and Cj,s still denotes total consumption of the composite good s in country j. The Cobb-
Douglas case studied in Section 3.3 corresponds to g = 1.
For simplicity let us focus on the case of perfect competition, ds = 0 all s. Following a pro-
cedure similar to that in Section 3.1, one can show that if sector-level price indices are given by
Equation (20), then the welfare impact of a shock generalizes to
ˆ Cj =
￿
å
S
s=1 ej,s
￿
ˆ l
￿1
jj,s
￿(g￿1)/#s
￿1/(g￿1)
. (44)
Gains from trade are thus given by
Gj = 1￿
￿
å
S
s=1 ej,s
￿
ljj,s
￿(g￿1)/#s
￿1/(g￿1)
. (45)
In Section 3.3, we have pointed out that multi-sector models with Cobb-Douglas preferences pre-
dict signiﬁcantly larger gains than one-sector models. Using Equation (45), we can now quantify
should instead use a properly weighted average of sector-level trade elasticities to calibrate one-sector models. Yet if
the true model is indeed a multi-sector model, it is not a priori obvious that there exists a single weighted average—
independently of how weights are deﬁned—that can be used to predict both changes in trade ﬂows and welfare.
33The existing literature rarely reports conﬁdence intervals. Two notable exceptions are Lai and Treﬂer (2002) and
Shapiro (2012) who use the standard errors of the trade elasticities that they have estimated to compute, and report, the
standard errors for the gains from trade liberalization.
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Figure 4: Gains from Trade computed according to Equation (45) for different levels of g. Sector-
level trade elasticities are from Caliendo and Parro (2010). Data are from WIOD in 2008.
the importance of the Cobb-Douglas assumption for this prediction. In Figure 4 we plot Gj as a
function of g using (45) for several countries—the United States, Canada, France, Germany, and
Japan—as well as the average Gj for all countries considered in Table 1. We see that the value of the
upper-level elasticity g—for which the existing empirical literature provides little guidance—has
large effects on the magnitude of the gains from trade. As we go from the Leontief case, g = 0, to
the Cobb-Douglas case, g = 1, to an upper-level elasticity equal to the average of lower-level elas-
ticities, g = 8, average gains from trade decrease from 45% to 15% to 3%.34 The intuition is simple.
If the elasticity of substitution between sectors is high, then the consequences of autarky are mit-
igated by consumers’ ability to substitute consumption away from the most affected sectors,i.e.,
those with lowest values of l
1/#s
jj,s , towards the least affected sectors, i.e., those with highest values
of l
1/#s
jj,s . By the same token, however, the gains from further trade liberalization would tend to be
higher with a higher g, since consumers could more easily reallocate their consumption towards
goods that experience larger price declines.35
34Intheparticularcaseinwhichalllower-leveltradeelasticitiesareequaltotheupper-leveltradeelasticity, #s = g￿1
for all s, the discrepancy between the predictions of multi-sector and one-sector models disappears: Equation (45)
reduces to Equation (12).
35The value of the upper-level elasticity of substitution also has more subtle implications for quantitative trade mod-
els with monopolistic competition. Away from Cobb-Douglas preferences, expenditure shares ej,s are no longer con-
stant, which may lead to multiple equilibria. Intuitively, a higher expenditure share in a given sector lead to more
entry, which reduces the price index in that sector, thereby leading to a higher expenditure share. Thus, one may obtain
different estimates of the gains from trade—or the effect of trade policy—depending on the counterfactual equilibrium
one focuses on. Another issue concerns the difference between the predictions of models with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity,
like Melitz (2003), and those without, like Krugman (1980). In Section 3.3, we have shown that in the Cobb-Douglas
case, entry effects lead to a distinction between the predictions of models with perfect and monopolistic competition,
but not between models with and without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity. This is no longer true in the case of general CES
42Upper-level Elasticities (II): Domestic versus Foreign. Another, and perhaps deeper issue re-
garding gravity estimates of the trade elasticity is that they capture the elasticity of substitution
between foreign sources of imports. Yet, the elasticity that one needs, for instance, for measur-
ing the gains from trade is the elasticity of substitution between home and import goods. To see
this formally, let us go back to the simple Armington model presented in Section 2.1, but let us
generalize Equation (1) so that
Cj =
￿
￿
Cjj
￿(g￿1)/g +
￿
CM
j
￿(g￿1)/g￿g/(g￿1)
,
where CM
j measures total consumption of imported goods,
CM
j =
￿
åi6=j y
s/(s￿1)
ij C
(s￿1)/s
ij
￿s/(s￿1)
.
The upper-level elasticity g > 1 now represents the elasticity of substitution between the domes-
tic good and the composite of the foreign goods, whereas the lower-level elasticity s > 0 still
represents the elasticity of substitution between foreign goods. The simple Armington model cor-
responds to the special case, g = s. Under this new demand system, bilateral trade ﬂows still
satisfy a gravity-like equation:
Xij =
 
PM
j
Pj
!1￿g  
Pij
PM
j
!1￿s
Ej, for all i 6= j, (46)
where Pij = tijPii is the price of goods from country i in country j; PM
j ￿
￿
åi6=j y1￿s
ij P1￿s
ij
￿1/(1￿s)
is the import price index; and Pj =
￿￿
Pjj
￿1￿g +
￿
PM
j
￿1￿g￿1/(1￿g)
is the consumer price index in
country j. In this more general environment, one can still rearrange bilateral trade ﬂows as we did
in Equation (13) and use the cross-sectional variation in trade ﬂows and trade costs to estimate
1￿ s.
Now, like in Section 2.2, consider a small change in trade costs that affects country j. The
change in the consumer price index is still given by
dlnPj = ljjdlnPjj +
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
dlnPM
j .
But our new demand system now implies
dln
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
￿ dlnljj = (1￿ g)
￿
dlnPM
j ￿ dlnPjj
￿
.
utility functions.
43Following the same strategy as in Section 2.2, one can therefore show that
dlnCj = dlnljj/(1￿ g). (47)
While gravity estimates can uncover the lower-level elasticity, s, Equation (47) shows that the
upper-level elasticity, g, i.e., the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, is
the relevant elasticity for welfare analysis.36
In standard gravity models, it is only the assumption of symmetric CES utility that allow re-
searchers to go from the commonly estimated elasticity, s, to the welfare-relevant elasticity, g.
When estimated, does the elasticity of substitution between home and import goods, g, look sim-
ilar to the elasticity of substitution between foreign goods, s? Head and Ries (2001) suggest that
the answer is yes. They measure the average of the elasticity of demand for Canadian goods in
Canada relative to U.S. goods and the elasticity of demand for U.S. goods in the United States
relative to Canadian goods. If all trade was U.S.-Canada trade, their estimate would therefore
provide an estimate of g. They ﬁnd an average elasticity equal to 7.8, quite in line with previous
gravity estimates of s. Likewise, using the methodology of Feenstra (1994) to estimate both g and
s, Feenstra, Obstfeld, and Russ (2013) cannot reject the null that g and s are equal.
Factor Supply Elasticities. The multi-sector gravity models that we have reviewed assume a
perfectly-elastic factor supply to each sector. Thus, except for the case with sector-level differences
in factor intensities considered in Section 3.5, the aggregate production possibilities frontier (PPF)
is linear. In practice one may expect factors to be imperfect substitutes across sectors. For instance
some workers may have a comparative advantage in particular sectors, as in a Roy-type model, or
some natural resources may be critical inputs to production in some sectors and not others. Such
considerations would lead to more “curvature” in the PPF and, conditional on observed trade
ﬂows, larger gains from trade.
To take an extreme example, consider the petroleum sector. The trade elasticity, #s, for this
sector estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2010) is around 70. The formula presented in Section 3.3
would therefore predict very small gains from trade in this sector. Yet, of course, one would expect
many oil importing countries to face enormous losses from moving to autarky. One simple way to
capture such considerations would be to go back to the multi-factor model presented in Section 3.5
and assume factors employed in the petroleum sector are speciﬁc to that sector, effectively making
petroleum an endowment. To explore the quantitative importance of this type of considerations,
we have recomputed the gains from trade in the multi-factor model under the assumption that
all sectors are perfectly competitive and all factors are sector-speciﬁc.37 In line with the previous
discussion, we ﬁnd larger gains from trade under the assumption that factors are sector-speciﬁc,
with the cross-country average for Gj going from 15.3% to 17.2%.
36In more general gravity models, this upper-level elasticity g would remain a key determinant for welfare analysis,
though not the only one.
37Formally, this amounts to using the formula for gains from trade given by Equation(32) under the assumption that
ds = 0 and ˆ cA
j,s = ej,s/rj,s for all s.
44Other Elasticities: Love of Variety and Extensive Margin. We conclude by discussing the cal-
ibration of the elasticity of substitution, s, and the extensive margin elasticity, h, introduced in
Equation (15) and its sector-level counterparts, Equations (20), (26), and (30). Given estimates of
the trade elasticity, #, these two elasticities are irrelevant for welfare analysis under perfect compe-
tition. Under monopolistic competition, however, we have seen that in the presence of intermedi-
ate goods, as in Section 3.4, or in multi-sector models with general CES preferences, as discussed
above, the values of s and h do matter above and beyond the value of the trade elasticity, #. In
these richer environments, the predictions of models with and without ﬁrm-level heterogeneity
are different and the magnitude of the difference crucially depend on how s and h are calibrated.
As shown in Section 3.2, the three elasticities #, s, and h are not independent of one another.
In gravity models, # determines the overall response of trade ﬂows to changes in trade costs,
whereas s ￿ 1 determine their responses at the intensive margin and h =
￿
#￿(s￿1)
s￿1
￿
determines
their response at the extensive margin, #￿(s ￿ 1), weighted by the love of variety, s￿1. Given an
estimate of the trade elasticity, #, one therefore only needs an estimate of s to compute h and vice
versa. The most direct way to estimate s or h is to use ﬁrm-level trade data; see e.g. Crozet and
Koenig (2010) and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011). When available, they offer a simple way to
estimate the intensive margin elasticity, i.e., by how much the sales of a given set of ﬁrms respond
to changes in trade costs, and the extensive margin elasticity, i.e., by how much the number of
ﬁrms responds to changes in trade costs.38 Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2011) estimate a value
of 1.5 for h in a one sector model, whereas Crozet and Koenig (2010) obtain estimates of #s and hs
for several sectors. Interestingly, the average hs across s estimated by Crozet and Koenig (2010) is
also 1.5, with little variation across sectors.39
Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) nicely illustrates the issues inherent to the calibration of mod-
els of monopolistic competition. The authors compare the predictions of a model without ﬁrm-
heterogeneity, like Krugman (1980), to those of a model with ﬁrm-heterogeneity, like Melitz (2003),
in a model with identical countries, three sectors, nested CES preferences, but no inter-industry
trade, ej,s = rj,s. Changes in real consumption are given by Equation (22). Using the fact that
hs =
￿
#s￿(ss￿1)
ss￿1
￿
, one can show that the overall scale effects,
￿
ˆ e
hs
j,sˆ rj,s
￿ds/#s
, are equal to
￿
ˆ rj,s
￿1/(ss￿1)
in the two models. Thus the only difference between the predictions of the two models comes
from the different values of ss used in the calibration of the two models. In their calibration, Bal-
istreri and Rutherford (2012) assume that #s is equal to 4.6 in both models, but that hs is equal
to 0 in the Krugman-version and 0.65 in the Melitz-version. This implies calibrated values of
38A related, though distinct way to estimate the relative importance of the intensive margin, s ￿ 1, consists in using
the prevalence of zeros in aggregate trade data; see Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008). The obvious drawback
of this approach is that gravity models, in general, do not allow for zeros, therefore creating a tension between the
structural model used for counterfactual analysis and the way its parameters are estimated; see Eaton, Kortum, and
Sotelo (2012) for recent work on this topic. Alternatively, one can rely more heavily on the overall structure of the model
and use other ﬁrm-level measures, like sales and markups, to estimate # and s; see e.g. Di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2009) and Hsieh and Ossa (2011). Once # and s are known, h can then be computed as a residual.
39This value is much larger than the value of hs = 0.65 used in Section 3.4. If one were to use hs = 1.5 rather than
0.65 when computing the gains from trade using Equation (29), one would conclude that gains from trade predicted
by models of monopolistic competition with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity cannot be ﬁnite for any country in our dataset.
45ss = #s/(1+ hs)+1 equal to 5.6 in the Krugman-version and 3.8 in the Melitz-version. This leads
to stronger love of variety and, in turn, larger entry effects and gains from trade liberalization in
the latter model. The question, of course, is whether one should take seriously that love of vari-
ety is much stronger than previously thought because the intensive margin is only one particular
margin of adjustment of trade ﬂows, ss ￿ 1 < #s, in models with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.
6 “Micro” versus “Macro” Numbers
Our chapter so far has described what could be referred to as a “macro” approach to quantifying
the consequences of globalization. The distinguishing features of this approach can be summa-
rized as follows. First, it aims to study the overall welfare gains from trade. Second, it is based on
commonly available aggregate trade data and a few key structural parameters. Third, it tries to
remain agnostic about micro-theoretical foundations. These foundations only matter to the extent
that they affect “macro” aggregates, as illustrated, for instance, in Equations (15) and (16).
A common alternative in the literature consists in following a “micro” approach, more closely
related to demand and production function estimation in Industrial Organization. Unlike the
“macro” approach described in this chapter, the “micro” approach typically focuses on one par-
ticular source of gains from trade using micro-level data, either at the product or ﬁrm-level. The
two most prominent examples of “new” sources of gains from trade emphasized in this literature
are: (i) gains from new varieties and (ii) productivity gains. The broad objective of this section
is to discuss how empirical evidence related to (i) and (ii), i.e., “micro” numbers, relate to the
predictions of quantitative trade models reviewed in this chapter, i.e., “macro” numbers.
6.1 Gains From New Varieties
One of the hallmarks of the “new trade theory” pioneered by Paul Krugman in the early 80s is
that consumers may gain from trade through access to new varieties. These may be direct gains
coming from trade in ﬁnal goods, as in Krugman (1979) and Krugman (1980), or indirect gains
coming from trade in intermediate goods, as in Ethier (1982b). An important contribution of the
empiricaltradeliteratureinthelastdecadeistoputanumberonthe“new-goods”channel; seee.g.
Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), Broda and Weinstein (2006), Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow,
and Rodríguez-Clare (2008), Feenstra and Weinstein (2010), and Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik,
and Topalova (2009).
In order to illustrate the similarities and differences with the “macro” approach of this chapter,
we will focus on the most inﬂuential paper in the “micro” approach: Broda and Weinstein (2006).
The starting point of this paper is the observation that statistical agencies typically ignore gains
from the creation of new varieties (and destruction of old varieties), when computing various
components of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), including the Import Price Index. The authors
then go on to ask: How different would measured changes in the Import Price Index of the United
States be if one were to take into account the creation and destruction of varieties over time?
46To answer this question, the authors ﬁrst need to deﬁne what the counterpart of a variety
in theory is in the data and then to specify a demand system to evaluate the welfare impact of
new varieties. Broda and Weinstein (2006) deﬁne a variety as a 10-digit HTS product from a
given country, e.g. “Umbrellas and Sun Umbrellas Having a Telescopic Shaft from China,” and
assume nested CES utility functions like in the present chapter. Given these assumptions, the
contribution of appearing and disappearing varieties to the import component of the CES price
index, i.e., the expenditure function of a representative US consumer, can then be computed using
an estimate of the elasticity of substitution across foreign varieties and measures of the changes
in the share of expenditures on continuing varieties as in Feenstra (1994). The main ﬁnding of
Broda and Weinstein (2006) is that, between 1972 and 2001, the decrease in the Import Price Index
associated with the expansion of imported varieties, and omitted by statistical agencies, has lead
to an additional 2.6% decrease in the U.S. CPI.
It should be clear that in spite of its use of micro-level data, the empirical strategy of Broda and
Weinstein (2006) has a lot in common with the approach presented in earlier sections of this chap-
ter. First, the focus is squarely on welfare, i.e. money metric indirect utility function that are con-
structed by means of the expenditure function. Second, the analysis heavily relies on functional
form assumptions, namely CES utility. In particular, the correction term introduced by Feenstra
(1994) is closely related to our welfare formula in the simple Armington model; see Equation (9).
The basic idea is that under CES utility, changes in relative prices can be inferred from changes
in relative expenditure modulo the elasticity of substitution. This is true regardless of whether
changes in relative prices are due to movements in the price of existing goods or the creation of
new goods, a fact that we have exploited more generally in Section 3.1.
There is, however, a number of notable differences. A beneﬁt of the “micro” approach taken
by Broda and Weinstein (2006) is that it only requires assumptions on the demand system, which
together with data on prices and quantities, are sufﬁcient to compute changes in the Import Price
Index of a representative consumer with nested CES utility. These “micro” numbers are inde-
pendent of technological considerations and market structure. In contrast, the “macro” numbers
presented in this chapter do heavily depend on functional form assumptions on the supply-side
of the economy, e.g. Fréchet distributions of productivity under perfect competition or Pareto
distributions under monopolistic competition.
The previous observation does not imply that technological considerations and market struc-
ture are irrelevant for such empirical micro studies. This is best illustrated by the following
thought experiment. Suppose ﬁrst, as Broda and Weinstein (2006) do in the last part of their analy-
sis, that Krugman (1980) is an accurate description of the world. Then changes in the Import Price
Index due to new varieties should be reﬂected one-for-one in the overall CPI. Under this assump-
tion, “micro” numbers indeed measure additional welfare gains. Now suppose instead that Eaton
and Kortum (2002) or some other Ricardian model is an accurate description of the world. There
is a priori nothing in the trade data that Broda and Weinstein (2006) look at that would contradict
this view of the world. Yet, under this alternative assumption on market structure and technol-
47ogy, changes in the Import Price Index due to the creation of new varieties should be exactly offset
by changes in the domestic component of the CPI due to the destruction of old varieties. In this
neoclassical world, the set of goods available to consumers is ﬁxed. So the “new-goods” channel
is rightly ignored by statistical agencies: in net, it should have no welfare effect. To put it bluntly,
“micro” numbers are unaffected by assumptions on technology and market structure, but whether
or not one should care about these numbers crucially depend on these assumptions.40
Another important difference between the “micro” approach taken by Broda and Weinstein
(2006) and the “macro” approach presented in this paper is that, at its core, the “micro” approach
is a measurement exercise, not a counterfactual exercise. The goal is to document what actually
happened in the data, e.g. in the United States between 1972 and 2001, not what could have
happened if China had grown at a different rate or if the United States had chosen different trade
policies. To address such counterfactual questions, one again needs the full structure of the model;
specifying and estimating a demand system is not enough.
6.2 Productivity Gains
In the canonical model of trade with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity developed by Melitz (2003), trade
liberalization causes a reallocation of resources from the least to the most productive ﬁrms. This
theoretical prediction has received considerable support in the data, with many empirical studies
ﬁnding very large effects of trade on measured productivity. For instance, Treﬂer (2004) ﬁnds that
the reallocation of market shares across ﬁrms following the Canada-US free trade agreement has
causedproductivity, measuredasrealvalueaddedperhourworked, togoupby8.4%inCanadian
manufacturing. Using the methodology of Olley and Pakes (1996) to measure productivity at the
ﬁrm-level, Pavcnik(2002)documentsproductivitygainsofthesameorderofmagnitudefollowing
the trade liberalization of the manufacturing sector in Chile.
The goal of this subsection is to clarify the relationship between productivity studies and the
body of work reviewed in this chapter. Given space constraints, we will make no attempt at sys-
tematically reviewing this large empirical literature; see e.g. Tybout (2001), Melitz and Treﬂer
(2012), as well as Melitz and Redding (2013) in this volume for excellent overviews. Here we will
focus on the following conceptual issues: What is the difference between productivity and wel-
fare? If welfare and measured productivity simultaneously go up, should we think of productivity
gains as a new source of gains from trade? At a qualitative level, should we always expect welfare
and measured productivity to go in the same direction? At a quantitative level, can we directly
compare the “micro” numbers from productivity studies with the “macro” numbers presented
earlier in this chapter?
In theory, productivity measures how much “output” one can produce with a given amount of
“input,” whereas welfare measures how much “consumption” one can afford. At the macro level,
40A similar issue arises if one believes that Melitz (2003) rather than Krugman (1980) is an accurate description of
the world. In this case, however, changes in the Import Price Index and the domestic component of the CPI due to the
creation and destruction of varieties only exactly cancel out under special circumstances, as discussed in footnote 12.
48the two concepts are therefore closely related. In a closed economy, the more productive a country
is, the more it can produce, and so, the more it consumes. This is why real GDP computed on
the revenue and expenditure sides coincide. In an open economy, the two concepts differ because
of terms-of-trade effects. Absent any shock to a country’s productivity, a country may be able
to consume more if it can purchase more imports with the same amount of exports, i.e., if its
terms-of-trade improve.
An obvious, but important difference between the results in this chapter and productivity
studies therefore lies in the treatment of terms-of-trade effects. They are central to our analysis.
In the simple Armington model, like in any neoclassical model, terms-of-trade effects are the only
channel through which foreign shocks may affect welfare in another country. One of the main
goals of quantitative trade models therefore is to predict the terms-of-trade changes associated
with particular shocks. In contrast, terms-of-trade effects play no direct role in productivity stud-
ies, whose main goal is to identify the consequences of trade liberalization on productivity at the
ﬁrm- and industry-level.
For the rest of our discussion, let us set aside the issue of terms-of-trade effects. The exact re-
lationship between measured productivity and welfare depends, of course, on how one measures
productivity as well as the model used to compute welfare; see Burstein and Cravino (2011) for a
general discussion. For our purposes here, let us simply assume that all ﬁrm-level data are con-
sistent with Melitz (2003) and that industry-level measures of productivity (in the data) increases
whenever the distribution of ﬁrm-level productivity (in the model) shifts to the right.41 Even un-
der such ideal circumstances, changes in measured productivity caused by reallocations across
ﬁrms and welfare may be quite different, as we now illustrate through a series of short examples.
Consider ﬁrst a small decrease in variable trade costs. The decrease in variable trade costs,
which can be thought of as an outward shift in the production possibility frontier, will lead to a
direct ﬁrst-order increase in welfare. In addition, there will be a reallocation of resources from
the least to the most efﬁcient ﬁrms, and this will lead to an increase in measured productivity at
the industry level. Since the initial equilibrium is efﬁcient under monopolistic competition with
CES utility, see e.g. Dhingra and Morrow (2012), this reallocation of resources is associated with
positive, albeit second-order, welfare effects. At this point, one might therefore be tempted to
conclude that the increase in measured productivity is an additional source of welfare gains. But
it should be clear that it is the reallocation rather than the change in productivity per se that has
caused the additional welfare gain.
To see this, consider the opposite shock: a small increase in variable trade costs. By the exact
same logic, this shock would decrease measured productivity at the industry level through the
expansion of the least efﬁcient ﬁrms. But as before, the reallocation of resources would remain
associated with positive, albeit second-order, welfare effects. That is to say, the ﬁrst-order welfare
41This assumption is less innocuous than it may appear. For instance, as Burstein and Cravino (2011) demonstrate,
if industry productivity is measured as total value added divided by total employment and the underlying model is
Melitz with a Pareto distribution of productivity, then measured productivity would be unaffected by the reallocation
of resources induced by trade liberalization.
49loss caused by the increase in trade costs is not as large as it would have been if workers had not
been reallocated and measured productivity had remained higher.
A careful reader may have noted that in the two previous examples, there nevertheless exists a
perfect correlation between measured productivity and welfare. When trade costs go down, as in
our ﬁrst example, both measured productivity and welfare go up. When trade costs go up, as in
our second example, the opposite is true. This is fairly intuitive. Any shock that tends to cause an
increase in real wages, i.e., welfare, should also tend to cause the exit of the least proﬁtable ﬁrms,
and in turn, an increase in measured productivity. This suggests that if one were only interested
in qualitative questions—did welfare go up or down?—changes in measured productivity may
still be used as a useful proxy for welfare changes. As intuitive as it may sound, the monotonic
relationship between measured productivity and welfare does hinge on the nature of the shock
being considered. This is illustrated by the results of Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) and
Felbermayr, Jung, and Larch (2011) who study the effects of import tariffs and export subsidies in
the Melitz (2003) model. Starting from free trade, they show that an import tariff increases welfare,
whereas an export subsidy decreases welfare. Yet, an import tariff leads to labor reallocations from
high- to low-productivity ﬁrms, whereas an export subsidy leads to a reallocation from low- to
high-productivity ﬁrms. In this situation, changes in measured productivity at the industry-level
and welfare move in opposite directions. The reason is that trade policy not only affects output
per variety, but also the set of available varieties, which consumers care about.
The previous discussion illustrates that changes in welfare and changes in measured produc-
tivity are, in general, qualitatively different. For the purposes of the present chapter, however, the
key question is not a qualitative one—“Are we getting the sign right when focusing on measured
productivity rather than welfare?”—but a quantitative one—“Even when changes in welfare and
measured productivity are of the same sign, are we getting the order of magnitude right?”. The
answer to the latter question depends on why ﬁrms of different productivity coexist in the econ-
omy. To take an extreme example, suppose that ﬁrms produce the same homogeneous good under
constant returns to scale using labor as their only factor production, but that because of taxes or
other distortions, the most efﬁcient ﬁrms are prevented from taking over the market. In this hypo-
thetical world, changes in measured productivity are trivially equal to changes in consumption,
and hence welfare. In this hypothetical world, “micro” and “macro” numbers should coincide.42
But this hypothetical world is very different from canonical models of trade with ﬁrm-level hetero-
geneity in which love of variety plays a central role. If one believes such models are a reasonable
description of the world we live in, one cannot simply celebrate the death of small ﬁrms because
they raise measured productivity within an industry. These ﬁrms may be less productive, but it
is efﬁcient for them to produce differentiated varieties in equilibrium. According to such mod-
42This equivalence is subject to the caveat that empirical studies typically identify the productivity changes in in-
dustries that experience changes in tariffs relative to those that do not; see e.g.Treﬂer (2004). If industries that do not
experience tariff changes are affected by trade liberalization through general equilibrium effects, “micro” numbers es-
timated using a difference-in-difference approach and “macro” numbers derived using the full structure of the model
would still differ.
50els, “micro” and “macro” numbers are bound to be different and, according to empirical studies
reviewed in Section 6.1, the difference between the two may be quite large.
To sum up: changes in measured productivity do not capture changes in welfare, either quali-
tatively or quantitatively, except in settings that are very different from canonical trade models.43
Simply put, “micro” studies estimating the effect of trade shocks on measured productivity and
“macro” studies quantifying the effect of trade shocks on welfare are getting at different things. To
us, there are costs and beneﬁts in both kinds of studies. Empirical micro studies such as Pavcnik
(2002) and Treﬂer (2004) have the great virtue of letting the data speak. Measured productivity
gains are what they are, regardless of what the underlying economic environment may be. How-
ever, whether such “gains” are a useful metric for policy evaluation remains open for discussion.
In contrast, quantitative macro studies such as those reviewed in this chapter aim to speak directly
to welfare considerations, albeit at the cost of stronger assumptions.
7 Life Without Gravity
We have described how gravity models can be used for quantitative analysis. We have shown that
even richer versions of these models can be calibrated using only a few elasticities. There is, how-
ever, a price to parsimony. All gravity models discussed in this chapter rely on strong functional
form assumptions. It is those functional form assumptions that allow researchers to estimate trade
elasticities from the cross-section—since elasticities are assumed to be constant across countries—
and use those to do counterfactual analysis—since elasticities are also assumed to be constant
across equilibria. We conclude by discussing alternative structural approaches to quantifying the
consequences of globalization that weaken the need for extrapolation by functional form.
7.1 Sufﬁcient-Statistic Approach
A recent literature in public ﬁnance has popularized “the sufﬁcient-statistic approach” to counter-
factual and welfare analysis. In the words of Chetty (2009), “the central concept of the sufﬁcient
statistic approach is to derive formulas for the welfare consequences of policies that are functions
of high-level elasticities rather than deep primitives. Even though there are multiple combina-
tions of primitives that are consistent with the inputs to the formulas, all such combinations have
the same welfare implications.” While there are some similarities between the approach described
in this chapter and the sufﬁcient-statistic approach in the public ﬁnance literature—namely, the
focus on high-level elasticities rather than the multiple combinations of primitives that are consis-
tent with those—there are also some key differences, which are best illustrated through a simple
43Although we have focused on Melitz (2003), which is, by far, the most inﬂuential trade model featuring ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity, the caveats illustrated by our simple examples apply more generally. Consider, for instance, the model
of monopolistic competition developed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In this model productivity varies across ﬁrms
because markups vary. Nevertheless, terms-of-trade effects as well as labor reallocations in and out of the outside
sector that affect the set of differentiated varieties available to consumers would still introduce a discrepancy between
measured productivity and welfare; see Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and Rodriguez-Clare (2012).
51example.
Consider a small, uniform change in tariffs, dln
￿
1+ tj
￿
, in some country j. The sufﬁcient-
statistic approach in the sense of Chetty (2009) consists in using envelope conditions from opti-
mization to reduce the set of parameters that need to be identiﬁed. In the case of a small open
economy j, the assumptions of (i) utility maximization and (ii) proﬁt maximization under perfect
competition imply, without any functional form assumptions, that the welfare changes associated
with a change in tariff are given by:
dlnCj =
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
￿ #SS ￿ dln
￿
1+ tj
￿
, (48)
where #SS ￿ dln Mj/dln
￿
1+ tj
￿
denotes the total elasticity of imports, Mj, with respect to the
tariff change. Since country j is a small open-economy, dlnCj simply represents the deadweight
loss associated with the tariff, i.e., Harberger’s triangle. In the international trade literature, the
previous formula is the basis of numerous papers evaluating the effects of trade policy; see e.g.
Johnson (1960) and Feenstra (1995).
Like in the analysis of the previous sections, Equation (48) emphasizes a unique upper-level
elasticity. It should be clear, however, that #SS plays a very different role than the trade elasticity
# in our previous analysis. Here, #SS is necessary to compute the area of the “triangle” below the
demand curve. In Sections 2 and 3, we are interested in “rectangles”: dlnCj =
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
dlntj in
the case of changes in iceberg trade costs. In this context, # is necessary instead to map changes
in prices into changes in shares of expenditures. Such changes can then be integrated to compute
the gains from trade in a straightforward manner.
The second difference between the two approaches comes from the nature of the upper-level
elasticity. #SS is a total elasticity in the sense that it captures all general equilibrium effects associ-
ated with the tariff change. In contrast, # is a partial elasticity: it captures the impact of changes in
trade costs or tariffs on trade ﬂows holding all general equilibrium effects ﬁxed; see Lai and Tre-
ﬂer (2002) and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) for discussions of the distinction
between the two. While the recent public ﬁnance literature has been very successful in exploiting
credible reduced-form estimates of the elasticity of taxable income, credible estimates of the total
import elasticity, #SS, are much more scarce; see Feenstra (1995). In contrast, estimating the trade
elasticity # using a gravity equation is fairly straightforward.
The third difference comes from the importance of price effects. In a closed economy, such
as the one considered in Harberger (1964), price changes are a transfer from one group of agents
to another. Thus they can be ignored in welfare computations. In an open economy, in contrast,
terms-of-trade effects do affect welfare. In the case of a large economy imposing a tariff, Equation
(48) generalizes to
dlnCj =
￿
1￿ ljj
￿
￿
￿
#SS ￿ dln
￿
1+ tj
￿
+ dlnPM
j
￿
,
where dlnPM
j is the change in the relative price of imports, i.e. the term-of-trade of country j.
52To assess the effect of a change in tariff in country j, one therefore either needs to observe price
changes after the shock or a model to predict dlnPM
j before the shock, as we did in earlier sections.
Alternatively, one can ignore terms-of-trade effects by focusing on welfare changes at the world
level; see Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Burstein and Cravino (2011), and Fan, Lai, and Qi (2013).
In this situation, we are back to the closed economy analysis of Harberger (1964).44
7.2 Other Structural Approaches
Another strategy, closely related to the sufﬁcient-statistic approach presented above, consists in
using optimality conditions to derive upper-bounds on the gains from trade. This is the approach
followed by Bernhofen and Brown (2005). They exploit a unique quasi-natural experiment: the
opening up of Japan in 1858. Under perfect competition, one can show that the gains from trade
are weakly lower than the difference between the vector of consumption in the trade equilibrium
and the vector of consumption in the autarky equilibrium, both evaluated at autarky prices, which
is itself lower than the opposite of the vector of net exports in the trade equilibrium, also evaluated
at autarky prices. Since Bernhofen and Brown (2005) have direct access to autarky prices in Japan
in 1858 as well as net exports in subsequent years, they can compute an upper-bound of the gains
from trade by assuming perfect competition, and nothing more. They ﬁnd upper-bounds between
5.4% and 9.1% of Japan’s GDP depending on the trade equilibrium they focus on. Unfortunately,
autarky prices are rarely available in practice.45
Costinot and Donaldson (2011) develop a structural approach that tries instead to weaken the
need for strong functional form assumptions by focusing on a very particular sector: agriculture.
The basic idea is that agriculture is a sector of the economy in which scientiﬁc knowledge of
how essential inputs such as water, soil and climatic conditions map into outputs is uniquely
well understood. As a result, when studying the consequence of restricting trade, one does not
needstrongfunctionalformassumptionstoextrapolatefrom“factual”productivitylevels, thatare
currently observed, to “counterfactual” productivity levels, that would be observed in economic
activities in which production does not currently take place, but would take place in the absence
of trade. Agronomists can provide direct information about “counterfactual” productivity levels.
Using very detailed micro-level data from the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Global
Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project, Costinot and Donaldson (2011) are able to construct the
Production Possibility Frontiers (PPF) associated with 1,500 U.S. counties and explore the gains
from economic integration between these local markets from 1880 to 2002.
44Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and Burstein and Cravino (2011) both feature models with monopolistic competition
and CES utility. In this case, envelope conditions from optimization can still be invoked since the solution of the
planning problem and the decentralized equilibrium coincide; see Dhingra and Morrow (2012).
45Irwin (2005) is another exception. He focuses on the Jeffersonian embargo from 1807 to 1809. He ﬁnds the cost of
autarky, i.e. the gains from trade for the United States over that time period, to be around 5% of GDP.
538 Concluding Remarks
The ﬁrst goal of our chapter was methodological. We have described how to use gravity models
to perform welfare and counterfactual analysis. An appealing feature of this approach, which we
have referred to as the exact hat algebra, is that the impact of various counterfactual scenarios can
becomputedwithoutestimatingthefullstructureofthemodel. Alltherelevantinformationabout
preferences, technology, and trade costs can be inferred directly from the cross-section of bilateral
trade ﬂows and estimates of the trade elasticity. This is a ﬂexible approach that requires only
commonly available data, that can be applied to answer a wide range of counterfactual questions,
and that can be generalized to study a rich set of economic environments.
The second goal of our chapter was to use this methodology to explore quantitatively how
various economic considerations—market structure, ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, multiple sectors, in-
termediate goods, and multiple factors of production—affect the magnitude of the gains from
trade as well as the effects of trade policy. What are the main lessons?
Out of the various economic channels that we study, multiple sectors and tradable intermedi-
ate goods appear to have the largest effects on the magnitude of the gains from trade. For example,
the gains from trade for the United States increase from 1.8% to 8.3% simply by moving from the
one-sector model to the model with perfect competition with multiple sectors and intermediate
goods. Market structure and ﬁrm-level heterogeneity also matter, though their implications are
more subtle. For instance, in the presence of multiple sectors, gains from trade may be higher or
lower under monopolist competition depending on whether countries specialize in sectors char-
acterized by larger or lower scale effects. Conditional on the same observed trade ﬂows, ﬁrm-level
heterogeneity may also lead to much larger gains through its indirect implications for the magni-
tude of scale effects in the presence of intermediate goods. Given the sensitivity of the predictions
of gravity models with monopolistic competition to scale effects, more direct evidence on their
magnitude would be very valuable.
Regarding the effects of trade policy, gravity models predict welfare gains from unilateral im-
port tariffs over a surprisingly large range. In the one-sector Armington model, the unilaterally
optimal tariff is well approximated by the inverse of the trade elasticity. Thus, a trade elasticity of
5 implies optimal tariffs of 20% around the world. In turn, it takes import tariffs to be as high as
50% to get back to the welfare levels observed under free trade. This range gets even larger once
we move from a one-sector to a multi-sector model. In addition, the overall welfare effects of large
unilateral tariffs on other countries appear to be minimal. Are these numbers we can believe in?
Is there something that is present in the data and absent from a baseline gravity model that would
dramatically affect these numbers?
The third goal of our chapter was to discuss the costs and beneﬁts of using gravity models to
quantifytheconsequencesofglobalization. Themainbeneﬁtofgravitymodelsisparsimony. They
rely on a few key structural parameters, ﬁrst and foremost the trade elasticity, that one can try to
estimate credibly in order to make counterfactual and welfare predictions. Parsimony, however,
comes at the cost of strong functional form assumptions. How restrictive are those? One would
54like to see more research regarding the ﬁt of gravity models. The fact these models can perfectly
ﬁt any cross-section of bilateral trade ﬂows certainly does not imply that out-of-sample their ﬁt
will be perfect as well. If so, what are the dimensions in which gravity models succeed and those
in which they fail? How do their predictions compare to reduced-form evidence on the gains
from openness? Would alternative models—or alternative ways of estimating the same models—
lead to different conclusions? In the short-run, can we think of the consequences of globalization
without recognizing that there may be important frictions in factor markets? In the long-run, can
we think of the consequences globalization without knowing how it affects growth? These are all
exciting opportunities for future research.
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63One Sector
(12)
Perfect
Competition
Monopolistic
Competition
Perfect
Competition
(data alphas)
Perfect
Competition
Monop.
Comp.
(Krugman)
Monop.
Comp.
(Melitz)
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AUS 2.3% 8.6% 3.7% 15.8% 15.7% 6.9% 6.8%
AUT 5.7% 30.3% 30.5% 49.5% 49.0% 57.6% 64.3%
BEL 7.5% 32.7% 32.4% 54.6% 54.2% 63.0% 70.9%
BRA 1.5% 3.7% 4.3% 6.3% 6.4% 9.7% 12.7%
CAN 3.8% 17.4% 15.3% 30.2% 29.5% 33.0% 39.8%
CHN 2.6% 4.0% 4.0% 11.5% 11.2% 28.0% 77.9%
CZE 6.0% 16.8% 21.2% 34.0% 37.2% 65.1% 86.7%
DEU 4.5% 12.7% 17.6% 21.3% 22.5% 41.4% 52.9%
DNK 5.8% 30.2% 24.8% 41.4% 45.0% 42.0% 44.8%
ESP 3.1% 9.0% 9.5% 18.3% 17.5% 24.4% 30.5%
FIN 4.4% 11.1% 10.5% 20.2% 20.3% 24.2% 28.0%
FRA 3.0% 9.4% 11.1% 17.2% 16.8% 25.8% 32.1%
GBR 3.2% 12.9% 11.7% 21.6% 22.4% 22.2% 23.5%
GRC 4.2% 16.3% 4.7% 23.7% 24.7% 6.8% 6.1%
HUN 8.1% 29.8% 31.3% 53.5% 55.3% 75.7% 91.0%
IDN 2.9% 5.5% 4.0% 13.1% 11.6% 11.2% 14.6%
IND 2.4% 4.6% 4.3% 9.2% 8.6% 9.5% 11.7%
IRL 8.0% 23.5% 14.2% 37.1% 38.9% 28.1% 29.1%
ITA 2.9% 8.7% 9.2% 16.4% 16.2% 21.7% 26.5%
JPN 1.7% 1.4% 3.7% 4.6% 3.5% 20.7% 32.7%
KOR 4.3% 3.9% 8.6% 12.5% 11.4% 44.1% 70.2%
MEX 3.3% 11.1% 12.1% 18.4% 18.6% 24.3% 28.4%
NLD 6.2% 24.3% 23.1% 40.1% 39.8% 43.4% 47.6%
POL 4.4% 18.4% 19.7% 33.8% 34.5% 46.9% 57.0%
PRT 4.4% 23.8% 20.6% 35.9% 37.4% 36.7% 40.3%
ROM 4.5% 17.7% 12.7% 26.4% 29.2% 20.8% 20.7%
RUS 2.4% 18.0% 0.9% 35.9% 30.7% -2.1% -7.1%
SVK 7.6% 22.2% 23.6% 48.3% 50.5% 78.6% 96.4%
SVN 6.8% 39.6% 39.3% 57.8% 61.6% 71.3% 79.7%
SWE 5.1% 12.5% 14.5% 24.4% 23.6% 36.6% 45.8%
TUR 2.9% 11.9% 13.3% 20.0% 20.9% 26.4% 29.5%
TWN 6.1% 9.6% 9.9% 19.9% 19.4% 28.6% 37.8%
USA 1.8% 4.4% 3.8% 8.3% 8.0% 8.6% 10.3%
RoW 5.2% 15.2% 7.3% 33.3% 28.4% 18.1% 21.8%
Average 4.4% 15.3% 14.0% 26.9% 27.1% 32.3% 40.0%
Multiple Sectors, No
Intermediates (23) Multiple Sectors, with Intermediates (29)
Gj expressed in percentages computed using:
Table 1: The numbers in parenthesis indicate the equation used for the computation. All data is
from WIOD and trade elasticities are from Caliendo and Parro (2010). Perfect competition and
monopolistic competition are obtained from the formulas using ds = 0 for all s and ds = 1 for all s,
respectively. Results for the Krugman and Melitz models are obtained setting hs = 0 for all s and
setting hs = 0.65 for all s, respectively.
64One Sector One Sector
Without
Intermediates
Without
Intermediates,
With
Dispersion
With
Intermediates
Without
Intermediates
With
Intermediates
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AUS -0.10% -0.13% -0.11% -0.28% -1.26% -1.38% -2.85%
AUT -0.09% -0.06% -0.05% -0.13% -2.97% -2.04% -4.31%
BEL -0.16% -0.12% -0.09% -0.26% -3.96% -2.63% -6.34%
BRA -0.10% -0.08% -0.07% -0.16% -0.81% -0.43% -0.86%
CAN -1.20% -1.16% -0.96% -2.28% -2.06% -2.14% -4.16%
CHN -0.22% -0.14% -0.12% -0.46% -1.56% -0.43% -2.28%
CZE -0.05% -0.03% -0.02% -0.08% -3.16% -1.34% -4.55%
DEU -0.16% -0.10% -0.08% -0.20% -2.48% -0.74% -1.83%
DNK -0.20% -0.09% -0.07% -0.26% -3.04% -1.32% -3.63%
ESP -0.06% -0.04% -0.03% -0.07% -1.46% -0.71% -1.88%
FIN -0.09% -0.04% -0.03% -0.10% -2.36% -0.94% -2.82%
FRA -0.09% -0.06% -0.05% -0.13% -1.51% -0.60% -1.43%
GBR -0.16% -0.15% -0.12% -0.31% -1.66% -1.50% -3.17%
GRC -0.08% -0.02% -0.01% -0.06% -1.84% -1.65% -3.03%
HUN -0.13% -0.06% -0.05% -0.17% -4.19% -2.54% -7.03%
IDN -0.09% -0.06% -0.05% -0.14% -1.56% -0.82% -2.33%
IND -0.16% -0.13% -0.11% -0.25% -1.17% -0.71% -1.65%
IRL -0.91% -0.56% -0.47% -1.58% -4.41% -2.17% -6.65%
ITA -0.07% -0.03% -0.03% -0.07% -1.47% -0.46% -1.31%
JPN -0.10% -0.05% -0.05% -0.11% -0.92% 0.24% 0.04%
KOR -0.21% -0.14% -0.12% -0.34% -2.31% 0.22% -1.06%
M EX -1.08% -0.87% -0.73% -1.67% -1.74% -1.11% -2.35%
NLD -0.22% -0.16% -0.13% -0.34% -3.33% -1.70% -4.04%
POL -0.04% -0.03% -0.03% -0.08% -2.21% -1.28% -3.18%
PRT -0.06% -0.05% -0.04% -0.09% -2.12% -1.85% -3.67%
ROM -0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% -2.08% -2.15% -4.56%
RUS -0.03% -0.05% -0.04% -0.12% -1.30% -2.84% -4.94%
SVK -0.05% -0.01% -0.01% -0.04% -3.97% -2.51% -6.22%
SVN -0.05% -0.04% -0.03% -0.10% -3.50% -2.44% -5.68%
SWE -0.15% -0.08% -0.07% -0.19% -2.71% -1.23% -3.18%
TUR -0.03% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -1.34% -0.45% -1.24%
TWN -0.45% -0.34% -0.29% -0.76% -3.40% -1.85% -5.13%
USA 0.21% 0.41% 0.26% 0.63% -0.80% -0.44% -1.00%
ROW -0.49% -0.43% -0.37% -0.97% -2.69% -2.45% -5.74%
Average -0.20% -0.14% -0.12% -0.33% -2.28% -1.36% -3.35%
Welfare Effect of Tariffs under Perfect Competition
Unilateral US 40% Tariff
Multiple S ectors Multiple S ectors
Uniform Worldwide 40% Tariff
Table 2: Counterfactual results are computed using the exact hat algebra. All data is from WIOD
and trade elasticities are from Caliendo and Parro (2010). See online Appendix for details.
Perfect
C ompetition
Perfect
C ompetition
Krugman Melitz Krugman Melitz
Region 1 2 3 4 5 6
Pacific Ocean -0.1% -1.2% -1.2% -0.6% -4.9% -4.1%
Western Europe -0.7% -2.6% -2.3% -1.6% -7.6% -10.3%
Eastern Europe -2.2% -0.8% -0.3% -4.4% -3.6% -4.5%
Latin America -0.7% -1.4% -1.2% -1.5% -3.1% -3.8%
North America -0.6% -0.4% -0.4% -1.2% -1.1% -1.3%
China -0.7% -1.3% -1.2% -2.5% -13.4% -20.3%
Southern Europe -0.7% -1.6% -1.5% -1.7% -4.8% -6.2%
Northern Europe -1.6% -2.0% -2.0% -3.2% -6.0% -6.5%
Indian Ocean -0.8% -0.9% -0.8% -1.9% -3.1% -5.5%
RoW -3.1% -1.4% -1.0% -6.4% -5.0% -8.0%
Average -1.1% -1.4% -1.2% -2.5% -5.3% -7.0%
Welfare Effect of a 40% Worldwide Tariff
Monopolistic
C ompetition
Without intermediates With intermediates
Monopolistic
C ompetition
Table 3: Counterfactual results are computed using the exact hat algebra. All data is from WIOD
and trade elasticities are from Caliendo and Parro (2010). See online Appendix for details.
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